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REGULATING AREAS OF CRITICAL STATE
CONCERN: FLORIDA AND THE MODEL
CODE
THOMAS G. PELHAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The widely acclaimed "quiet revolution" in state land use regula-
tion has produced a variety of new land use controls.' Of these re-
cent innovations, critical area controls have emerged as the most
popular technique for protecting and promoting state and regional
* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law, and Mem-
ber of the Florida Bar; B.A., Florida State University, 1965; A.M., Duke University,
1967, J.D., Florida State University, 1971; LL.M., Harvard University, 1977.
This Article is a companion to the author's previous study of the Florida DRI proc-
ess, Regulating Deielopments of Regional Impact.- Florida and the Model Code, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV, 789 (1977). Revised editions of both articles appear in the author's
book. STATE LAND USE PLANNING AND REGULATION: FLORIDA, THE MODEL CODE
AND BEYOND (D.C. Heath & Co., 1979). Since 1972, the author has benefited from,
and gratefully acknowledges, many discussions with numerous persons involved in
the development and implementation of Florida's state land use legislation. A special
debt of gratitude is owed to James May. Chief, and Stephen Fox, Senior Planner and
Critical Areas Section Leader, Bureau of Land and Water Management, Division of
State Planning, State of Florida, for providing invaluable documentation and infor-
mation on the Florida critical areas process, and to Robert M. Rhodes, the first chief
of the Florida Bureau of Land & Water Management and presently a member of the
law firm of Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer & Rhodes, in Tallahassee, Florida, for
reading and criticizing an earlier draft of this Article. Needless to say, however, the
views expressed in this Article are strictly those of the author.
I Although now outdated, F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLU-
TION IN LAND USE CONTROLS (1971), is still a useful review of the earliest of the new
state land use controls. For discussions of some of the more recent state land use
legislation, see R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES (1976); R. LINOWES & D.
ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND-USE CONTROLS (1975). Probably the best
overview of state land use planning and regulation is the excellent treatise, D.
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interests in the use and development of land.' The term "critical
area" is a reference to a geographical area possessing unique charac-
teristics which make it of significant interest to inhabitants of the
state or region beyond the boundaries of local governments within
whose jurisdictions part of the area is located.3 An area's criticalness
may derive from its historical,' environmental, or natural resources,5
from its major development potential,6 from the existence of
problems, conditions, or mutually reinforcing land use interdepen-
dencies that require areawide management,7 or from the location of
major public facilities in the area.8
Critical area controls single out such areas for special land use reg-
ulation by state or regional agencies or local governments. Although
local governments may continue to exercise regulatory powers in
such areas, the critical areas technique usually subjects adoption and
exercise of local development regulations to some form of state or
regional supervision. Thus, the critical areas technique allows the
state to intervene expeditiously in areas of genuine state concern
while simultaneously providing for a continuing local role in these
areas. Moreover, local autonomy is entirely preserved in noncritical
areas. These features of the critical areas technique should make
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION (1976) [herein-
after cited as MANDELKER], which also contains detailed analyses of selected state
land use programs.
2. See Mandelker, Critical Areas Controls. 4 New Dimension in American Land
Development Regulation, 41 AM. INST. PLAN. J. 21 (1975).
3. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LAND USE POLICY AND PROGRAM ANAL-
YSIS No. 5: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS-STATE CRITICAL AREAS PROGRAMS 1
(1975).
4. Historical resources were an important consideration in the designation of the
Florida Keys as an area of critical state concern. See note 214 and accompanying text
infra.
5. Preservation of natural resources was the motivating factor in the New York
legislature's designation of the Adirondack Park as a critical area. See notes 20, 21
and accompanying text infra.
6. Managing rapid development was a primary consideration in the designation
of the Lake Tahoe Region for special regulatory treatment, see notes 28-30 and ac-
companying text infra, while promoting planned development principally motivated
the creation of the Hackensack Meadowland District, see notes 31-37 and accompa-
nying text infra.
7. The interdependence of water, wetlands, and wildlife habitat figured promi-
nently in Florida's designation of the Green Swamp as an area of critical state con-
cern. See notes 192-194 and accompanying text infra.
8. The existence of valuable public facilities were cited by Florida officials as jus-
tification for designation of both the Green Swamp and the Florida Keys as critical
areas. See notes 195-97, 215 and accompanying text infra.
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state intervention less objectionable to entrenched local governments
and opponents of greater public control of private property.
Two general approaches to state regulation of critical areas have
emerged: regulation of an entire geographical region legislatively
designated on an ad hoc basis and comprehensive statewide mecha-
nisms for administrative designation and regulation of critical areas.
Several states, of which California,9 Massachusetts, ° New Jersey,"
New York,' 2 and North Carolina 3 are prime examples, have experi-
mented with the critical areas technique on an ad hoc regional basis
through legislative designation of discrete geographical areas. At
least six states-Colorado,"4 Florida, 5 Minnesota,16 Nevada,' 7 Ore-
9. The California legislature singled out the San Francisco Bay area for special
regulatory treatment in 1955 when it enacted the Bay Area Air Pollution Control
Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24345-24375 (Deering 1975) (repealed 1975),
in an effort to combat the regional air pollution problem. See Brooks, The Metropolis,
Home Rule, and the Special District, I I HASTINGS L.J. 110 (1959-60) for a discussion
of the act. In 1969 California joined Nevada in designating, with congressional ratifi-
cation, the Lake Tahoe region as an interstate critical area. See notes 28-29 and ac-
companying text infra, for a brief discussion of this designation. In 1976 the
California legislature enacted the California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 30000-30900 (Deering Supp. 1978), which designates the state's entire
coastal zone as a critical area requiring special regulatory treatment.
10. By special act the Massachusetts legislature in 1977 designated Martha's Vine-
yard, an island, as a critical area. 1977 Mass. Acts ch. 831. See notes 24-27 and
accompanying text infra.
1I. In 1968 the New Jersey legislature singled out the Hackensack Meadowlands
for special regulatory treatment. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:17-1 to -86 (West Cum. Supp.
1978-79). See notes 31-37 and accompanying text infra.
12 In 1971 the New York legislature conferred critical area status on the
Adirondack Park. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text infra.
13. In 1974 the North Carolina Legislature designated that state's entire coastal
zone as a critical area. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-100 to -128 (1978). For a detailed
analysis of the North Carolina legislation, see Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, The Legal
Implementation of Coastal Zone Management: The North Carolina Model, 1976
DUKE L.J. I; Schoenbaum, The Management of Land and Water Use in the Coastal
Zone .4 New Law is Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C.L. REy. 275 (1974).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-65.1-201, -202, -401, -501 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Colo-
rado legislation is analyzed in White & Petros, Land Use Legislation: H.B. 1034 and
H B. 1041, 6 THE COLO. LAW. 1686 (1977); Kurtz-Phelan, H.B. 1041: 4 Step Toward
Revponsible and Accountable Land Use Decisions, 6 THE COLO. LAW. 1718 (1977).
15 FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1977). For earlier discussions of Florida's legislation, see
the excellent introductory essay, Finnell, Saving Paradise. The Florida Environmental
Land and Water Management 4ct of 1972, URBAN L. ANN. 103 (1973); and Com-
ment, Area of Critical State Concern. Its Potentialfor Effective Regulation, 26 U. FLA.
L. REV. 858 (1974).
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16G.01 to .14 (West 1977).
17 NEv. REV. STAT. § 321.655(2), .755, .770(l)(a) (1977).
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gon'8 and Wyoming 9 have enacted comprehensive statewide pro-
grams for regulating critical areas. While sharing a common
purpose, the two approaches have produced markedly different regu-
latory systems.
A. Ad Hoc Regulation of Critical Areas
The most impressive implementations of critical area controls have
occurred in states using the technique on an ad hoc regional basis.
Under this approach, a particular region of the state is designated as
critical by state legislation establishing a special regulatory system for
the area. The legislation has no application beyond the designated
area. If another area of the state becomes of crucial importance to
the state or region, the state legislature may confer critical area status
upon it only by enacting new legislation that may differ significantly
from its earlier enactment. A survey of the most prominent examples
of the ad hoc regional approach is instructive not only in evaluating
statewide comprehensive critical area programs but also in illustrat-
ing the versatility of the critical areas technique.
The Adirondack Park Agency is an example of how critical area
controls may be used for preservationist purposes. Encompassing ap-
proximately six million acres of wilderness area in northeastern New
York State, the Adirondack Park is larger than the entire state of
Massachusetts. Approximately sixty percent of the park's acreage is
in state ownership; the remainder is privately owned. As a national
and international tourist attraction, a major source of water, and the
site of substantial forest, agricultural and mining industries, the park
is subject to conflicting demands for preservation and development.
The location within the park's boundaries, either wholly or partially,
of 119 separate local government units made it virtually impossible to
fashion a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the park's
problems.2 °
In response to this situation, the New York legislature, in 1971,
created the Adirondack Park Agency and authorized it to adopt and
18. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.400, .405 (1977).
19. Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-19-102(a)(ii), 9-19-203(a)(ix) (1977).
20. Booth, The Adironback Park Agency Act. A Challenge in Regional Land Use
Planning, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 612, 613-15 (1975).
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implement a comprehensive land use controls system for the dual
purpose of preserving and using the vast resources of the area.21 The
agency was required to prepare and implement a legislatively ap-
proved land use and development plan and map for the park. Within
the constraints of the use districts and density guidelines established
by the plan, constituent local governments are permitted and en-
couraged to adopt detailed local land use programs to effectuate the
purposes of the Act.22 Certain categories of proposed development
are subject to binding agency review for conformity with the regional
or local plan.23
A unique example of how the ad hoc regional approach may be
employed to manage the coastal zone is provided by Martha's Vine-
yard, an island off the southeastern coast of Massachusetts. The is-
land's quaint old villages, colonial architecture, sandy beaches and
scenic beauty have made it a national tourist attraction and an attrac-
tive site for commercial development. 24 To protect the unique natu-
ral, historical, ecological and cultural values of the island, the
Massachusetts legislature in 1977 created the Martha's Vineyard
Commission 25 and authorized it to implement and administer a regu-
latory system that is essentially an application of Article 7 of the
American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code (Model
Code). 26 Within its territorial jurisdiction, which includes seven local
governmental entities, the Commission is empowered to designate
districts of critical planning concern and developments of regional
impact and to adopt guidelines and standards with which local regu-
lation of such districts or development must conform.27 Thus, the
21. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 801 (McKinney Supp. 1972-78).
22. Id §§ 807, 808. 818.
23 Id §§ 809, 810.
24 Graves, Martha's Vineyard, 1961 Nat'l Geographic 780; Island Properties, Inc.
v. Martha's Vineyard Commn, 361 N.E.2d 385, 386 (Mass. 1977).
25 1977 Mass. Acts, ch. 831, §§ 1, 2.
26 ALl, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975) [hereinafter cited as Model
Code]. Article 7 provides for the designation and regulatory supervision of develop-
ments of regional impact and areas of critical state concern by a state administrative
agency Id For an excellent analysis of Article 7, see MANDELKER, supra note 1, at
63-126. The derivative Martha's Vineyard legislation is discussed in Jaffe, Island
Properties r. Martha's Vineyard Commission: Regional Planning and the ALl Code, 29
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4 (No. 6, 1977).
27. 1977 Mass. Acts §§ 3, 9.
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Massachusetts Legislature has transplanted Article 7's dual regula-
tory techniques from the state level to a single area of the state.
The ad hoc regional approach to regulating critical areas has been
used on an interstate basis to manage growth and development in an
environmentally endangered area, the Lake Tahoe basin. Straddling
the California-Nevada border, the basin, over a third of which is cov-
ered by Lake Tahoe, includes portions of two California counties, a
California city, and three Nevada counties. Because of its natural
beauty and the growth of the gambling industry, the basin has at-
tracted an increasing number of tourists and substantial residential
development, thereby endangering the water quality of Lake
Tahoe.28 Consequently, the U.S. Congress in 1969 ratified an inter-
state compact between California and Nevada which created the
basinwide Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.29 The primary respon-
sibilities of the agency are the formulation of a regional plan for the
basin and the adoption of implementing regulations that are binding
on all constituent local governments.30
Although critical area controls are commonly associated with envi-
ronmental or preservationist concerns, the Hackensack Meadowlands
District demonstrates how the technique may be used to promote de-
velopment. Prior to 1968, the Hackensack Meadowlands consisted of
approximately 21,000 acres of vacant swamps, meadows and marsh-
lands located in the New York City-New Jersey metropolitan area
and distributed among two counties and fourteen municipalities. 3'
Due to its low elevation, unfavorable soil composition and political
fragmentation, the Meadowlands, although urgently needed for in-
dustrial, commercial, residential and recreational purposes in a bur-
geoning metropolitan area, had resisted comprehensive
28. Comment, Regional Governmentfor Lake Tahoe, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 706
(1971); Ayer, Water Qualiy Control at Lake Tahoe: Dissertation on Grasshopper
Soup, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1273, 1276 (1970).
29. Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969). Congressional ratification was re-
quired by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, which provides: "No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State . " The California codification of the compact is found at CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 66800-66801 (Deering 1974 & Supp. 1978). The Nevada codification is
found at NEV. REV. STAT. § 277.190 to .220 (1977).
30. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 66801 (Deering 1974 & Supp. 1978); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 277.200 (1977).
31. Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 112 N.J. Super. 89, 97, 103, 270
A.2d 418, 422, 425 (1970), aj9'd, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 991 (1973).
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development.3 2 Thus, in 1968 the New Jersey legislature designated
a large portion of the area as the Hackensack Meadowland District
and created a development commission for the purpose of re-
claiming, planning and developing the area.33 The Commission, a
separate political subdivision of the state,3 4 is empowered to under-
take any development necessary to reclaim and improve the dis-
trict.3 5 It is required to prepare, adopt and implement a master
development plan and subdivision regulations to which all municipal
land development regulations must conform .36 No constituent local
government may undertake any project requiring expenditure of
public funds, and no structure or subdivision may be commenced
without prior approval of the Commission.37
Several features of the various ad hoc regional experiments are
noteworthy. First, each establishes a regional agency with jurisdic-
tion over the entire designated area. Local government powers are
subordinated to those of the regional entity which has either the
power to regulate directly certain activities in the area or to review
and disapprove local regulation. Second, with the exception of the
Martha's Vineyard Commission, each embodies a strong planning
component. The regional agency is authorized to prepare and adopt
a comprehensive regional plan to which local plans or development
regulations must conform. Third, these ad hoc approaches collec-
tively demonstrate that critical area controls may be used to attack a
broad array of regional problems.
B. Comprehensive Statewide Mechanisms
Comprehensive statewide mechanisms for designating and regulat-
ing critical areas provide an interesting contrast to the ad hoc re-
gional approach. Of the six states using this approach, most have
adopted a modified version of the Model Code's critical areas tech-
nique. Basically, the Model Code identifies three broad categories of
critical areas and authorizes a state administrative agency to desig-
nate areas of critical state concern from among those categories and
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:17-I (West 1979).
33. Id § 13:174, -5, -6.
34. Id § 13:17-5(a).
35 Id § 13:17-60).
36. Id § 13:17-6(i), -9, -11(b).
37. Id § 13:17-12(a), -12(b), -14(a).
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establish guiding principles for their development."8 Local govern-
ments within a designated area must submit land development regu-
lations to a state administrative agency.39 Local land use decisions
made pursuant to the regulations are then subject to review and dis-
approval by the agency.4" While each of the six states adopting the
comprehensive statewide approach has borrowed from the Model
Code concept, each state also has deviated from the ALI proposal in
some significant respects.
Colorado deviates sharply from the Model Code by allowing local
governments rather than a state agency to designate "areas of state
interest."41 Although the Colorado Land Use Commission may re-
quest local governments to designate a particular area of state interest
and seek judicial review of a local refusal to make the requested
designation,4" the Commission has no power to directly designate
such areas. In specifying an area of state interest, a local government
must adopt guidelines and may enact implementing regulations in
accordance with statutory criteria for administering the area.43 Con-
sistent with the weak role accorded the state under the Colorado sys-
tem, the Commission may review and recommend modifications in
local guidelines, however, its recommendations are purely advisory.44
Nevada vests both its governor and local governments with the
38. Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-201.
39. Id § 7-203(1).
40. Id § 7-203(3).
41. Colorado's statutory criteria are, however, much more restrictive than the
Model Code categories. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-102(4), 24-65.1-301(1) (Supp.
1976). Local governments may designate areas of state interest only from among the
following categories: "(a) mineral resource areas; (b) natural hazard areas; (c) areas
containing, or having a significant impact upon, historical, natural, or archeological
resources of statewide importance; and (d) areas around key facilities in which devel-
opment may have a material effect upon the facility or the surrounding community."
Id § 24-65.1-201. The scope of the Colorado categories is reduced by restrictive stat-
utory definitions. E.g., "Key facilities" include only airports, major facilities of a
public utility, arterial highway interchanges, and rapid or mass transit stations. .d
§ 24-65.1-104(7). "Natural resources of statewide importance" include only shore-
lands of major publicly-owned reservoirs and significant wildlife habitats. Id § 24-
65.1-104(12). "Historical or archeological resources of statewide importance" encom-
pass only resources officially included in the national register of historic places or a
list compiled by the state historical society, or designated by statute. Id § 24-65.1-
104(6).
42. Id § 24-65.1-407.
43. Id § 24-65.1-402.
44. Id § 24-65.1-406.
[Vol. 18:3
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power to designate "areas of critical environmental concern."45 The
extent to which the state may regulate such areas is not clear. If the
governor or a local government finds an area to be of critical environ-
mental concern, the state land use planning agency must provide
planning assistance for the area in accordance with policies recom-
mended by an appointive advisory council.4 6 The recommended
planning policies may include implementing land use regulations,
but such regulations are effective only if approved by the governor.4 7
Unfortunately, the Nevada legislation does not state whether the rec-
ommended planning policies are binding upon local governments.
The Wyoming legislature has conferred upon the Wyoming Land
Use Commission4 the power to designate areas "where uncontrolled
or incompatible large-scale development could result in damage to
the environment, life or property, . . . and such additional areas as
the Commission determines to be of more than local concern., 49 The
significance of this broad grant of power is diminished by the lack of
strong statutory controls over designated areas. The Wyoming Com-
mission, like its counterpart in Nevada, must establish development
guidelines and provide planning assistance to local governments in a
designated area.5" The Wyoming act does not, however, specify
whether local governments in such an area are bound by the guide-
lines. Moreover, the act does not provide for state review of local
development regulations and decisions in designated areas.
Oregon also lacks a well-defined statutory process for designating
and regulating critical areas. The Oregon Land Conservation and
Development Commission, an appointive state board,5" is empow-
45. NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.770(l) (1977). "Area of critical environmental con-
cern' is defined as "any area in this state where there is or could develop irreversible
degradation of more than local significance but does not include an area of depleting
water supply which is caused by the beneficial use or storage of water in other areas
pursuant to legally owned and fully appropriated water rights." Id § 321.655(2).
46 Id §§ 321,755, 321.770. The land use planning advisory council consists of 17
members appointed by the governor. Members must be either elected officials or rep-
resentatives of local political subdivisions. Id §321.740.
47 Id § 321.770(4), (5).
48. WYo. STAT. § 9-19-202(a) (1977) provides in part: "The Commission shall
consist of nine (9) members appointed by the governor."
49 Id §§ 9-19402(a)(ii), 9-19-203(a)(ix).
50. Id § 9-19-203(a)(ix)-(x).
51. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.030(1) (Supp. 1977) establishes the "Land Conservation
and Development Commission consisting of seven members appointed by the Gover-
nor, subject to confirmation by the Senate."
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
ered to recommend "designation of areas of critical state concern" to
the state legislature, which may then make the designation and estab-
lish a regulatory system for the area.52 Probably because legislative
approval is required, the Oregon statute neither restricts the catego-
ries of areas that may be designated nor provides for a regulatory
process of general applicability to all designated areas.5 3 Therefore,
the Oregon act only institutionalizes the ad hoc regional approach to
managing critical areas.
Only Florida and Minnesota have detailed state administrative
processes for both designating and regulating critical areas. The criti-
cal areas legislation of each state closely tracks the Model Code pro-
posal, although the Minnesota system is slightly more deviant than
the Florida version. The Minnesota act 4 authorizes the governor,
pursuant to the recommendation of a state agency, to designate "ar-
eas of critical state concern" from among statutory categories similar
to those contained in the Model Code and the Florida act.5 It does
not, however, provide for state administrative review of land devel-
opment decisions in as many areas as the Florida and Model acts. 6
On the other hand, in a significant advance beyond the Florida and
model acts, the Minnesota act requires the preparation of land use
plans by each local government in a critical area and provides for
binding state administrative review of local plans.5 ' The Model
52. Id § 197.405(2)-(5).
53. See id
54. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116G.06 (West Supp. 1977). The Minnesota Environ-
mental Quality Board, composed of various state officials and four members ap-
pointed by the governor, has statutory responsibility for recommending critical area
designations to the governor. Id §§ 116G.03, 116G.03(2), 116G.06(l).
55. The Minnesota statute allows designation of critical areas having the follow-
ing characteristics: "(1) an area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect
upon, an existing or proposed major government development which is intended to
serve substantial numbers of persons beyond the vicinity in which the development is
located and which tends to generate substantial development or urbanization. (2) An
area containing or having a significant impact upon historical, natural, scientific, or
cultural resources of regional or statewise importance." Id §§ 116G.05, 116G.06(i),
Compare the Minnesota categories with those of the Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-
201(3), and Florida, FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2) (1977).
56. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116G.01 to .14 (West Supp. 1977). The Model
Code's provisions for state administrative review are found at Model Code, supra
note 26, § 7-501 to -503. Florida's statutory provisions for state administrative review
are found at FLA. STAT. § 380.07 (Supp. 1978).
57. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116G.07 (West Supp. 1977).
(Vol, 18:3
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Code does not impose a planning requirement,5" and the Florida sys-
tem, while containing a mandatory local planning requirement, does
not provide for binding state review of local plans. 9
C. The Florida Critical Areas Program
This Article analyzes Florida's experience with the critical areas
technique. Although Florida has used its critical areas process spar-
ingly, its experimentation with the comprehensive statewide tech-
nique exceeds that of any other state with the possible exception of
Colorado. Three of the states, Oregon,6" Nevada,6 and Wyoming62
have not designated any critical areas pursuant to their comprehen-
sive legislation. Minnesota has employed its comprehensive appara-
tus to designate two critical areas; however, one designation has
already lapsed and no regulations have been approved for the
other. 3 Although numerous local governments in Colorado have
designated one or more areas, 64 the Colorado system, with its rejec-
tion of a strong state role, is atypical of the comprehensive statewide
approach envisioned by the Model Code and implemented in Flor-
ida.
58. See Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-201 to -208.
59. See notes 136-137, 147 and accompanying text infra.
60. Interview with Lloyd Chapman, Plan Review Specialist, Oregon Department
of Land Conservation and Development, in Salem, Oregon (August 15, 1978). Ac-
cording to Mr. Chapman, it is unlikely that the Oregon critical areas legislation will
ever be implemented because of the scope and success of the state's comprehensive
state and local planning program. Id The Oregon state and local planning legislation
is found at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005 (Supp. 1977).
61 Telephone interview with Robert Erickson, Administrator, Division of State
Lands, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, State of Nevada, Carson
City, Nevada (Oct. 17, 1978).
62. Interview with Peter Willing, Director, Office of Land Use Administration,
State of Wyoming, in Cheyenne, Wyoming (Aug. 8, 1978). The Wyoming Land Use
Commission officially tabled the state's critical areas process in 1978 without ever
adopting any rules of implementation or designating any areas. Id
63. Telephone interview with Cliff Aichinger, Critical Area Program Coordinator,
Minnesota Environmental Quality Board, Minneapolis, Minnesota (October 13,
1978). The first designation, the Lower St. Croix River, lapsed after three years pur-
suant to MINN. STAT. ANN. § I 16G.06(2)(C) (West Supp. 1977). The second designa-
tion, the Mississippi River corridor in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, is still in effect,
but local regulations and plans have not been reviewed and approved by the state
board. Interview with Aichinger. supra.
64. Interview with Ted Rodenback, Principal Planner, Colorado Land Use Com-
mission, in Denver, Colorado (Aug. 21, 1978).
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In sharp contrast to the dearth of experience with the critical areas
technique in other states, Florida has officially designated three criti-
cal areas. In each area the statutorily prescribed regulatory frame-
work has been established, thereby providing a basis for some
tentative conclusions as to the efficacy of the comprehensive critical
areas technique. Moreover, Florida is the first jurisdiction in which
the constitutionality of a comprehensive statewide critical areas pro-
gram has been judicially determined and in which amendatory legis-
lation has been enacted to cure constitutional deficiencies. Thus, of
the existing comprehensive statewide programs, the Florida critical
areas process is the most promising candidate for fruitful analysis.
Part II of this Article describes and analyzes the various phases of
Florida's original critical areas process. The critical areas technique
has three discrete phases: designation, regulation and adjudication.
The institutional arrangements and the procedural requirements de-
vised by the Florida legislature for implementing each of these
phases are examined in detail.
Part III analyzes Florida's implementation of the critical areas
technique. Three areas, the Big Cypress Swamp, the Green Swamp,
and the Florida Keys, have been officially designated as areas of criti-
cal state concern. A fourth area, the Appalachicola River Valley, has
been proclaimed by the Florida Division of State Planning as an
unofficially designated critical area. This part describes each of the
critical areas, evaluates the land development regulations adopted in
each of the areas, and analyzes the adjudication of conflicts resulting
from application of the regulations.
The Florida critical areas technique subjects land use regulation,
traditionally considered by many local governments to be their exclu-
sive domain, to state control. It also singles out some private prop-
erty for special regulatory treatment, and authorizes an
administrative agency to exercise the legislative power of designation.
Constitutional and other legal challenges by municipalities and pri-
vate land owners to the validity of such controls are, therefore, inevi-
table.
A Florida appellate court recently responded to such attacks by
declaring that certain designation provisions of the state's critical ar-
eas legislation constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Using
these judicial decisions as a vehicle, Part IV examines the non-dele-
gation doctrine as a barrier to implementation of comprehensive crit-
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ical area controls and discusses the Florida legislature's response to
these decisions.
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. The comprehensive
approach, as conceived by the Model Code and implemented in Flor-
ida, imposes much less potent controls on critical areas than do most
of the ad hoc approaches. Moreover, unlike the ad hoc approach,
which results in immediate designation and regulation of critical ar-
eas, the comprehensive statewide approach simply establishes an ad-
ministrative mechanism requiring further implementation in order to
subject critical areas to state or regional supervision. As the Florida
experience amply demonstrates, activation of such mechanisms is not
an easy matter. Florida has succeeded in officially designating only
three critical areas, one of which was designated by the state legisla-
ture rather than by the appointed state agency. Moreover, with the
notable exception of the Florida Keys, Florida has used its critical
areas technique primarily as a natural resource management tool in
largely undeveloped, rural areas. Finally, the Florida experience
suggests that reliance on an administrative apparatus for designating
critical areas creates legal and political problems that possibly can be
minimized, if not completely avoided, by legislative designation.
Thus, despite the considerable achievements of the Florida program,
other states should study it carefully before rejecting an ad hoc ap-
proach in favor of a more comprehensive solution to the critical areas
problem.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF FLORIDA'S CRITICAL AREAS
TECHNIQUE
Critical area controls consist of three distinct processes: designa-
tion, regulation and adjudication. The first process entails the official
designation of a discrete geographical area as one of critical state
concern. After the designation becomes final, a regulatory system for
the area must be devised and implemented. Finally, disputes arising
out of the designation and regulatory processes must be resolved in
accordance with established adjudicatory procedures.
The Florida technique has its genesis in the Florida Environmental
Land and Water Management Act of 197265 (Environmental Land
Act) which provided for each of the three essential processes. Like its
65. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-317 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 380.012 to .12 (1977) and
(Supp. 1978)) [hereinafter referred to as the Environmental Land Act].
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prototype, Article 7 of the Model Code, the Environmental Land Act
did not make planning a prerequisite to regulation of critical areas.
The original regulatory system, however, has been supplemented by
state and local mandatory planning legislation.66 While the planning
legislation has not been implemented fully, it will eventually affect
the regulatory process in critical areas. This section analyzes the stat-
utory framework, as created by the original Environmental Land Act
and the planning legislation, for implementing the Florida critical ar-
eas technique.
A. Designation
The Environmental Land Act authorizes the Administration Com-
mission, a state administrative agency consisting of the Florida gov-
ernor and cabinet, to designate areas of critical state concern.67 The
cabinet is a constitutional body consisting of six popularly elected
state officers.68 Thus, by vesting the designation power in elected of-
ficials, the Environmental Land Act departed from the Model Code
which would authorize an appointive state land planning agency to
make designations. 69 Given the essentially legislative nature of a
critical area designation and its potential impact on local govern-
ments, the Florida arrangement is preferable to the ALI proposal. As
popularly elected state officials, the governor and cabinet have a
greater measure of direct political accountability to the state citizenry
and, therefore, can confer a greater degree of legitimacy on critical
area designations than appointive officials.
The Administration Commission's power to designate is subject
both to significant substantive limitations and procedural require-
ments. Substantively, under the original Act, the Commission's
power to designate was limited to the following broad area catego-
ries:
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon,
environmental, historical, natural, or archaeological resources of
regional or statewide importance.
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant
66. See notes 96-97, 118-150 and accompanying text infra.
67. FLA. STAT. § 380.031(I), 05(l)(b) (1977).
68. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
69. Model Code, supra note 26, §§ 7-201, 8-101. The Model Code proposes that
the state land planning agency be located within the governor's office and headed by a
director appointed by the governor. Id § 8-101(2).
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effect upon, an existing or proposed major public facility or
other area of major public investment.
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which
may include a proposed site of a new community, designated in
a state land development plan.7°
The Environmental Land Act provides no other designation guide-
lines nor does it require the Administration Commission to promul-
gate administrative standards for exercising the designation power.7'
As discussed in Part IV, these omissions figured prominently in judi-
cial consideration of the Act's constitutionality.
Florida's original critical area categories represented a modest ex-
pansion of the Model Code categories. While the first category is
essentially identical to its Model Code counterpart,72 Florida's "ma-
jor public facility" standard is somewhat broader than that of the
Model Code. The Code defines "major public facility" as "any pub-
licly owned facility of regional significance" but excludes from this
definition several significant public facilities.73 By contrast, the Flor-
ida act defines "major public facility" as "any publicly owned facility
of more than local significance."'74
On paper, Florida's original "proposed area of major development
potential" was also much more inclusive than the Model Code's new
community standard. 75 The Florida terminology, which was re-
70. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2) (1977).
71. See id, § 380.05 (1977). The Model Code also does not require promulgation
of administration standards for exercise of the designation power. See Model Code,
supra note 26, § 7-201 to -208. Cf, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 6G.05, 116G.06(1) (West
Supp. 1977) (requiring the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board to make critical
area recommendations to the governor in accordance with criteria prepared and
adopted pursuant to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act).
72. Compare FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(a) (1977) with Model Code, supra note 26,
§ 7-201(2)(b), which reads as follows: "an area having a significant impact upon his-
torical, natural or environmental resources of regional or statewide importance."
73. Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-201(3)(a). The excluded public facilities are:
(a) any public facility operated by a local government, or an agency created by it,
primarily for the benefit of the residents of that local government; (b) any street or
highway except an interchange between a limited access highway and a frontage ac-
cess street or highway; (c) any airport that is not to be used for instrument landings; or
(d) any educational institution serving primarily the residents of a local community.
74, FLA. STAT. § 380.031(10) (1977Y.
75. Compare FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(c) (1977) with Model Code, supra note 26,
§ 7-201(3)(c), which states: "a proposed site of a new community designated in a
State Land Development Plan, together with a reasonable amount of surrounding
land."
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pealed in 1979, was broad enough to encompass areas surrounding
and including major developments such as utility plants, airports,
port facilities and highway systems, as well as new community sites
and other areas, such as inner city urban renewal or rehabilitation
sites, that are likely to attract major developments. The apparent
breadth of this category may, however, have been deceptive. Only
areas of major development potential that are "designated in a state
land development plan" fell within the scope of this standard. Flor-
ida's state comprehensive plan,76 the only state land development
plan currently in existence, does not designate such areas. Although
in 1978 the Florida Bureau of Comprehensive Planning was engaged
in a project to identify areas of major development potential, 77 pre-
sumably this project was terminated by repeal of this category.
Florida's original critical area standards fail to match or exceed
those of the Model Code in only one respect. The ALI proposal per-
mits designation of land within the jurisdiction of a local government
not having an effective development ordinance within three years af-
ter the critical areas technique has been adopted.78 Florida chose not
to adopt this provision. This deviation from the Model Code, how-
ever, is rendered largely insignificant by Florida's subsequent enact-
ment of a mandatory planning and regulation requirement for all
local governments.79
The breadth of Florida's critical area categories is diminished by a
significant quantitative restriction: at any given time designated criti-
cal areas collectively may not exceed five percent of the state's land
area.80 Clearly, this arbitrary restriction, not imposed by the Model
76. See text accompanying notes 118-32 infra.
77. In 1978, the Florida Bureau of Comprehensive Planning was engaged in a
project to identify areas of major development potential, but its completion was ex-
pected to take two or three more years. Interview with Estus Whitfield, Senior Plan-
ner and Project Leader for Land Development, Bureau of Comprehensive Planning,
Division of State Planning, State of Florida, in Tallahassee, Florida (July 19, 1978).
78. Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-201(3)(d).
79. See notes 136-43 and accompanying text infra.
80. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(17) (1977). Five percent of Florida's land area amounts
to only about 1.8 million acres. Interview with Stephen Fox, Senior Planner and Crit-
ical Areas Section Leader, Bureau of Land and Water Management, Division of State
Planning, State of Florida, in Tallahassee, Florida (July 20, 1978). The Administra-
tion Commission was also prohibited from designating more than 500,000 acres as
critical areas within the initial 12-month period following the effective date of the
Environmental Land Act. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(17) (1977). Additionally, the Admin-
istration Commission was prohibited from designating any critical area until an in-
ventory of state-owned lands was prepared, id § 380.05(l)(a), and "until a favorable
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Code, reflects a legislative fear of administrative overuse of the criti-
cal areas technique. Whether by accident or design, it also consti-
tutes a safeguard against misuse of the technique since the
Administration Commission will be unable to apply it to genuinely
critical areas if the five percent quota is wasted on less important ar-
eas. Regardless of the motivation or the wisdom of the restriction, it
significantly reduces the potential application of the technique in
Florida.
Procedurally, the Administration Commission's power to designate
is subject to the requirements of both the Environmental Land Act
and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA).81 The former
stipulates that the Administration Commission may designate critical
areas only upon the recommendation of the Division of State Plan-
ning.82 In formulating its recommendation, the Division of State
Planning must consider the recommendations of the various regional
planning agencies which in turn are required to solicit the suggestions
of local governments within their respective jurisdictions.83 The Di-
vision's recommendation to the Administration Commission must
describe the boundaries of the proposed critical area, explain why the
area is of critical state or regional concern, state the dangers that
would result from uncontrolled development of the area and the ad-
vantages to be derived from coordinated development of the area,
and recommend specific standards for guiding development of the
area.
84
Within forty-five days of the recommendation's receipt, the Ad-
ministration Commission must either reject the proffered recommen-
vote at a referendum on a state bond program for the acquisition of lands of environ-
mental importance to the state or region." 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-317, § 13. These
conditions were satisfied. See Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1066-
67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
81. The Environmental Land Act provides that "the Administration Commission
shall .,. by rle designate the area of critical state concern." FLA. STAT.
§ 380.05(1 )(b) (1977) (emphasis added). The Florida Administrative Procedure Act,
FLA STAT. § 120.50 to .73 (1977), establishes detailed requirements for state agency
rulemaking proceedings. See notes 88-94 and accompanying text infra.
82. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(1)(a) (1977). The Division of State Planning (the Divi-
sion) is the state land planning agency designated by Florida law to undertake state-
wide comprehensive planning. Id § 23.012.
83. Id § 380.05(3). If the Division does not designate areas recommended by a
regional planning agency or local government, it must give a written explanation of
its decision to the regional or local entity. Id
84. Id § 380.05(l)(a).
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dation or adopt it, with or without modification, and must also
designate the area as one of critical state concern by administrative
rule.85 In addition to designating the area, the rule must set forth
"principles for guiding the development of the area." There are no
statutory standards for delineating these guiding principles except for
the requirement that the economic impact of the principles on current
development in the area must be considered. 86 While the Commis-
sion may provide that the guiding principles shall apply to develop-
ment commenced subsequent to the designation but prior to adoption
of local critical area land development regulations, the Commission
has no authority to impose a moratorium on development in the
area.
8 7
In adopting a designation rule, the Administration Commission
must also comply with the procedural requirements of the APA.
While an exhaustive treatment of the APA is beyond the scope of this
Article, 8 several of the Act's requirements, as they relate to the
designation process, should carefully be noted. Since designation is
by administrative rule, a designation can be made only in accordance
with the APA's rulemaking provisions. The Administration Com-
mission must give the statutorily prescribed notice of its intention to
adopt a proposed designation rule,89 prepare a detailed statement of
the rule's economic impact,90 give affected persons who so request an
85. Id § 380.05(l)(b).
86. Id
87. Id. This restriction is totally inconsistent with the critical areas concept. Cf.
Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-202 (providing for a moratorium on issuance of local
development permits during the period between notice to a local government of a
proposed designation rule and adoption of the rule).
88. For extensive discussions of the Florida APA, see England & Levinson, Ad-
ministrative Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749 (1977); Levinson, The Florida Administra-
tie Procedure Act." 1974 Revsion and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617
(1975).
89. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (1977). The notice must contain:
a short and plain explanation of the purpose and effect of the proposed rule, a
summary of the proposed rule, the specific legal authority under which its adop-
tion is authorized, and a summary of the estimate of the economic impact of the
proposed rule on all persons affected by it.
Id
90. Id § 120.54(2)(a). The economic impact statement must include:
(1) An estimate of the cost to the agency of the implementation of the proposed
action, including the estimated amount of paperwork; (2) An estimate of the cost
or the economic benefit to all persons directly affected by the proposed action; (3)
An estimate of the impact of the proposed action on competition and the open
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opportunity to present evidence and argument pertaining to any issue
raised by the proposed rule,9 and schedule and conduct a public
hearing in accordance with the APA upon the request of any affected
person.92 In addition any substantially affected person may, within
fourteen days after publication of the notice of intent to adopt a
designation rule, request an administrative determination that the
proposed rule is an invalid exercise of the agency's delegated legisla-
tive authority. An administrative decision of invalidity, if judicially
affirmed, prevents adoption of a proposed designation rule.93 Fi-
nally, any adversely affected party may seek judicial review of a
designation rule.94 Thus, while the APA's panoply of procedural
safeguards provides protection against arbitrary agency action, it
may also constitute formidable obstacles to the designation of critical
areas in Florida.95
market for employment, if applicable; and (4) A detailed statement of the data
and method used in making each of the above estimates.
Id An agency's failure to prepare an adequate economic impact statement is a suffi-
cient ground for declaring a rule invalid if the issue is raised in either an administra-
tive or judicial proceeding within one year of the rule's effective date. 1d
§ 120.54(2)(c).
The economic impact statement requirement, adopted by the Florida legislature in
1976. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-276, was not in existence when the Administration Com-
mission designated the Green Swamp and the Florida Keys as areas of critical state
concern. See notes 198-99. 213 and accompanying text infra.
91. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1977).
92 Id
93, Id § 120.54(4). This procedure was used to challenge the proposed land de-
velopment regulations for the Green Swamp area of critical state concern. See text
accompanying notes 199-202 infra.
94. FLA STAT. § 120.68(1) (1977) provides in part: "A party who is adversely af-
fected by final agency action is entitled to judicial review." The Administration Com-
mission's adoption of a designation rule constitutes final agency action. City of Key
West v Askew, 324 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
95. The APA rulemaking provisions greatly complicated the Administration
Commission's designation of the Green Swamp as an area of critical state concern.
See notes 199-202 and accompanying text infra. In emergency situations the Admin-
istration Commission could use the APA's emergency rulemaking provisions to cir-
cumvent temporarily the normal rulemaking procedures. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(9)(a)
(1977) provides that "[i]f an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public
health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule
necessitated by the immediate danger by an procedure which is fair under the circum-
stances and necessary to protect the public interest." Id However, emergency rules
must not exceed "that action necessary to protect the public interest under the emer-
gency procedure" and must be adopted in accordance with procedures that at a mini-
mum comport with state and federal constitutional requirements. Id Moreover,
emergency rules are not effective for more than 90 days and are not renewable. Id
198o]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
B. Regulation
The Florida critical areas regulatory process is derived from three
separate acts: the Environmental Land Act, the Florida State Com-
prehensive Planning Act of 1972,96 and the Florida Local Govern-
ment Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975. 97 Since passage and
implementation. of the three acts have not coincided, their require-
ments have not yet crystalized into a well-coordinated regulatory sys-
tem. Nevertheless, each act supplies an important component of the
regulatory process that will emerge ultimately in each of Florida's
critical areas. Therefore, the requirements of each act, and their rela-
tionship to each other, must be considered.
1. The EnvironmentalLandAct. Essentially, the parent act, like the
Model Code, provides only for state review of locally adopted land
development regulations in critical areas. Within six months after
designation of a critical area, each local government within the desig-
nated area must submit to the Division of State Planning either its
existing land development regulations or newly prepared and
adopted regulations.98 If a local government submits regulations
within the specified time, the Division must by rule approve the regu-
lations if they comply with the guiding principles contained in the
designation rule. If a local government, however, fails to submit de-
velopment regulations within the six-month period, or submits regu-
lations that do not comply with the guiding principles, the Division
must within 120 days submit to the Administration Commission rec-
ommended regulations applicable to the defaulting local govern-
ment's portion of the critical area. Within forty-five days after
receipt of the Division's recommendation, the Commission must ei-
ther reject or accept, with or without modification, the recommended
regulations and by rule establish land development regulations for
the local government.99
§ 120.54(9)(c). Consequently, as one Florida court has noted, the APA emergency
rule-making provisions are not adequate for the purposes of the critical areas tech-
nique. Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1069 n.16 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.011 to .0193 (West Supp. 1979). The Act is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 118-35 infra.
97. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 to .3211 (1977). The Act is discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 138-50 infra.
98. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(5) to (8) (1977).
99. Id § 380.05(8). Adoption of regulations by the Administration Commission
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Critical area regulations, whether proposed by local governments
and approved by the Division or imposed by the Commission, must
be adopted within twelve months after adoption of the designation
rule. Failure to comply with this requirement results in the auto-
matic termination of the critical area designation. In addition, no
part of the area can be redesignated as critical until one year after the
date of termination. This limitation is not imposed in cases where the
Commission by rule voluntarily terminates, either wholly or par-
tially, the designation of any area.'
°
The Administration Commission's power to adopt land develop-
ment regulations is coextensive with that of the local government to
which the regulations are applicable with one important exception.
The Commission cannot adopt any rule providing for a moratorium
on development even if the local government in question is vested
with such power.'' Otherwise, the Commission may adopt "any
type of regulation that could have been adopted by the local govern-
ment."10 2 Thus, the scope of the regulatory power available to the
Commission varies with the powers of the local governments located
within the critical area. Given the widely divergent powers of home
rule cities, general law counties and charter counties in Florida,13
this restriction on the Commission's regulatory powers could result in
significantly different sets of regulations within a single area of criti-
does not preclude a local government from proposing its own regulations at a later
date. If such regulations are approved by the Division of State Planning, they super-
sede the state-imposed regulations. Id § 380.05(10).
100. Id § 380.05(12), (18).
101. Id § 380.05(l)(b). This limitation is criticized and compared with the Model
Code's provisions at note 87 supra.
102. Id § 380.05(8).
103. Under the Florida constitutional municipal home rule provision, "munici-
palities . . have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to
conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal
services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise pro-
vided by law." FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b). FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1977), which
implements the constitutional home rule provision, provides in part: "(1) As provided
in article VIII, section 2(b) of the state constitution, municipalities . . . may exercise
any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law. (2) 'Mu-
nicipal purpose' means any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or
its political subdivisions."
Counties with noncharter governments "have such power of self-government as is
provided by general or special law. The board of county commissioners of a county
not operating under a charter may enact. . . county ordinances not inconsistent with
general or special law." FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f). Counties with charter govern-
ments "have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law
1980)
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cal state concern, a possibility that seems wholly inconsistent with the
critical areas concept.i"
A comprehensive regional approach to critical area regulations is
also hindered by the Environmental Land Act's exemption of devel-
opment in critical areas from the development of regional impact
(DRI) regulatory process. DRI, defined by the Act as "any develop-
ment which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would
have a substantial effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens
of more than one county," ' 5 is subject to a special regulatory proc-
ess. An application for permission to undertake DRI must be re-
viewed by a regional planning agency which prepares and submits to
local government a regional impact statement. Local government
must consider the regional impact statement in rendering its decision
on the application. 06 The local DRI decision, if timely appealed by
an appropriate party, is then subject to review by a state agency hav-
ing power to affirm, modify or reverse the local order.'0 7 Thus, the
DRI technique is intended to ensure that local DRI decisions take
into consideration and accommodate state and regional interests.
Since areas of critical state concern by definition are affected with
state and regional interests, there is even more justification for sub-
jecting DRI in such areas to the DRI regulatory process than there is
for DRI in non-critical areas. Nevertheless, the Environmental Land
Act inexplicably exempts DRI in critical areas from the DRI regula-
tory requirements.108 Pursuant to its rulemaking power, the Division
has attempted to close the statutory gap in the regulatory process by
providing that DRI in critical areas shall be subject to the DRI re-
view process "when the rule designating the area of critical state con-
.... The governing body of a county operating under a charter may enact county
ordinances not inconsistent with general law." Id § 1(g).
For an analysis of local governmental powers in Florida, see Sparkman, The His-
tory and Status ofLocal Government Powers in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 271 (1973).
104. For a similar criticism of the Model Code's critical area provisions, see
Mandelker, supra note 1, at 76-77.
105. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1977). For a more detailed analysis of the Florida
DRI process, see Pelham, Regulating Developments of Regional lmpat." Florida and
the Afodel Code, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 789 (1977).
106. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7), (8), (11) (1977).
107. Id § 380.07.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 380.05(13), .06(5)(b). The Model Code also exempts DRI
in critical areas from the DRI regulatory process. See Model Code, supra note 26,
§ 7-207.
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cern so provides."' 9 However, neither of the designation rules for
Florida's first two administratively designated critical areas provided
that DRI in these areas shall be subject to the DRI process. 1
Administration of critical area regulations is the exclusive respon-
sibility of local government. All land development regulations,
whether adopted by the Administration Commission or by local gov-
ernments with the approval of the Division, must "be administered
by the local government as if the regulations constituted, or were part
of the local land development regulations."' I IThus, when a devel-
oper applies for a development permit, local government processes
the application exactly as it would have prior to the critical area
designation with a few minor procedural changes. Local government
must give notice to the Division, and to other classes of persons speci-
fied by the Division, of any application for a development permit." 2
If local government denies an application for a development permit,
it must specify in writing its reasons for denial "and indicate any
changes in the development proposal that would make it eligible to
receive the permit.""' 3 Finally, if local government issues a develop-
ment order, it must transmit a copy of the order to the Division as
well as to the developer." 14
The effectiveness of any regulatory system depends upon its en-
forcement. Two enforcement mechanisms are established by the En-
vironmental Land Act. First, if the Division determines that
development orders issued by local governments are not compatible
with local land development regulations, the Division may appeal the
order to a state reviewing agency for administrative review of the
local decision and then to an appropriate court for judicial review.1 15
Adjudication of land development decisions in critical areas is dis-
cussed in a following section. Second, if the Division determines that
local administration of development regulations "is inadequate to
protect the state or regional interest," the Division "may institute ap-
propriate judicial proceedings to compel proper enforcement of the
109. 8 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-1.30.
110. See id 22F-5 (Green Swamp designation rule); Id. 22F-8 (Florida Keys
designation rule).
111. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(8) (1977).
112. Id § 380.05(16).
113. Id § 380.08(3).
114, Id § 380.07(2).
115. Id § 380.07(2), (4).
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...regulations."16 While the statutory language is ambiguous, this
provision apparently refers to situations in which local governments
either do not require developers to comply with development regula-
tions prior to undertaking development or fail to ensure developer
compliance with the regulations after a development order permitting
development has been issued. Effective use of this mechanism re-
quires extensive monitoring by the Division of local governments and
development within the critical area. Obviously, the Division's abil-
ity to perform this essential function is contingent upon adequate
staff and budgetary resources.' 1 7
Standing alone, the Environmental Land Act's critical area's regu-
latory scheme is woefully inadequate. It is based exclusively on the
Model Code's system of state review of local regulations and it pro-
vides for little formal state participation in the administration of local
regulations. Clearly, it pales by comparison with the regulatory sys-
tems imposed by most ad hoc regional mechanisms for controlling
critical areas. Under the Environmental Land Act and the Model
Code, the development of a comprehensive regional approach to crit-
ical area management would be purely accidental. Fortunately, Flor-
ida has moved beyond the Model Code by enacting state and local
comprehensive planning legislation which may cure some of the defi-
ciencies of the original critical areas regulatory system.
2. The Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act. Although en-
acted in the same legislative session as the Environmental Land Act,
the Florida state planning act was not implemented until 1978.118
Originally, the Act required the Division to prepare and submit a
proposed state comprehensive plan to the Governor "for his consid-
eration and action"." 9 The purpose of the plan was to "provide
long-range guidance for the orderly social, economic, and physical
growth of the state by setting forth goals, objectives, and policies."' 120
116. Id § 380.05(9).
117. The Florida official responsible for supervising the state's critical areas pro-
gram states that enforcement is potentially the biggest problem with the program be-
cause of staff and budget limitations. Interview with James May, Chief, Bureau of
Land & Water Management, Division of State Planning, State of Florida, in Talla-
hassee, Florida (July 21, 1978).
118. Interview with Helge Swanson, Chief, Bureau of Comprehensive Planning,
Division of State Planning, State of Florida, in Tallahassee, Florida (July 19, 1978).
119. FLA. STAT. § 23.012(1), .013(1) (1977).
120. Id § 23.0114(l).
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After approval by the Governor, the proposed plan was to be submit-
ted to the Florida legislature for its approval. If approved by the
legislature, the plan was to be effective as state policy.'2
When the proposed plan was finally submitted for legislative ap-
proval in 1978,122 the Florida legislature declined to give it legally
binding status. Rather, the legislature amended the state planning
act to define the state plan as "the goals, objectives, and policies con-
tained within the state comprehensive plan prepared by the Divi-
sion,"' 123 and to provide that the plan "shall be advisory only, except
as specifically authorized by law."' 2 4 Furthermore, the legislature
decreed that no part of the state plan, "[elxcept as specifically author-
ized by law,. . . shall be implemented or enforced by any executive
agency."'125 Hence, only those portions of the plan previously au-
thorized by law currently have legal status.
The state plan consists of fourteen sections covering various as-
pects of Florida's social, economic and physical growth.1 26 Each sec-
tion contains three types of policy statements of varying degrees of
specificity: goals, objectives and policies. A goal is defined as "a
broad statement of purpose, intended to define an ultimate or desired
end." 127 An objective is the statement of "a specific accomplishment,
or series of accomplishments, necessary to the satisfactory pursuit of
a goal." 12' A policy suggests "specific ways to achieve objectives."' 129
For each modified or new policy set forth in the plan, a recommenda-
tion of the action required to implement the policy is also made.' 30
Of the plan's fourteen sections, each of which potentially affects
121. Id §23013(1), (2).
122. DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ADMINISTRATION, THE
FLORIDA STATE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN i-ii (1978) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA
STATE PLAN].
123 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-287, § I (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.0112(5)
(West Supp. 1979)).
124. Id § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.014(1) (West Supp. 1979)).
125 Id § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23.013(2) (West Supp. 1979)).
126 The 14 sections are agriculture, economic development, education, employ-
ment and manpower, energy, growth management, health, housing and community
development, land development, recreation-leisure, social services, transportation,
utihties and water. FLORIDA STATE PLAN, supra note 119, at iii.
127. Id at 3.
128. Id
129. Id
130. d at 4, 8-9.
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critical areas, the land development section obviously has the most
immediate impact upon the regulation of land use in such areas. A
major premise of this section is that land is a finite resource which
has not been developed in Florida in accordance with an overall
management strategy. The land development section is conceived as
the first step toward such a strategy.13 ' Following its delineation of
several overall goals, objectives and policies, the section sets forth
specific objectives and policies for twelve land-related resource cate-
gories: air, uplands, wetlands, water, soils, agriculture, minerals,
amenities, beaches and dunes, natural hazard areas, transportation
facilities and electrical power facilities.'32
A true understanding of the land development section can be
gained only by studying the objectives and policies for each of the
plan's twelve components. For illustrative purposes, the objective
and policies for management of wetlands, a land resource of special
significance to Florida's three officially designated critical areas, are
set forth here:
WETLANDS
OBJECTIVE I: PROTECTION
The values and functions of wetlands and submerged lands
should be retained and protected.
POLICIES
Encourage the development and use of wetlands and sub-
merged lands for only those purposes which are compatible with
their natural values and functions.
Encourage the use of wetlands, commensurate with their natu-
ral functions and capabilities, as a substitute for or supplement
to technology and structures.
Encourage the reestablishment of wetlands in previously
drained areas, where feasible.
Allow intensive use of wetlands and submerged lands for only
those major developments of state significance that, by their gen-
eral purpose, require location in these areas.
Enable wetlands to be reasonably used by individuals for pur-
poses which will not adversely affect the values and functions of
these resources.
Discourage the discharge into wetlands and submerged lands
131. Id at 103.
132. Id
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of pollutants or materials in amounts which would destroy or
significantly harm their values and functions.
Discourage the drainage of wetlands and submerged lands.
Prohibit commercial, industrial, residential, and other devel-
opment from locating on state-owned or submerged lands when,
by their general purpose, such developments need not be located
on these lands.
Give maximum protection to wetlands and submerged lands
that have been designated as having special significance to the
state.
Require that development in adjacent upland areas be lo-
cated, designed, and constructed so as to minimize the adverse
impacts on the values and functions of wetlands and submerged
lands.
Encourage research designed to assess the relative values of
various wetlands and submerged lands in the state.,33
Clearly, such policies, if fully implemented, will significantly restrict
development in wetland areas.
How will the state comprehensive plan affect the regulation of crit-
ical areas? Since the state plan is not a regulation, it has no direct
effect on land use. To the extent that its provisions are specifically
authorized by law, a fact that will be difficult to ascertain, given the
voluminosity of the plan document, 134 the state plan can be imple-
mented and enforced in critical areas. How such implementation and
enforcement will be achieved is not clear since neither the Environ-
mental Land Act nor the two current critical area designation rules
link the regulatory process to the state comprehensive plan.135 How-
ever, all local governments in Florida are required to adopt compre-
hensive plans which must be coordinated with the state plan and with
which all local land development regulations must be consistent.
Theoretically, therefore, state planning policies, if implemented
through local plans, can indirectly influence land use in critical areas.
To fully comprehend how this process is intended to operate, it is
necessary to examine Florida's local planning requirements.
3. The Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. The
central requirement of the Florida local planning Act is that all local
133. Id at 110-111.
134. The plan document consists of 208 pages. See FLORIDA STATE PLAN, supra
note 122.
135. See FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1977); 6 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22 F-5, 22F-8.
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governments, with a few minor exceptions, must prepare and adopt a
comprehensive plan in accordance with the Act's provisions no later
than July 1, 1979.136 Failure to comply with the mandatory planning
requirement invokes harsh penalties. If a municipality fails to adopt
a plan within the statutory period, it will be governed by the compre-
hensive plan of the county in which it is located. If a county defaults
on its statutory responsibility, the Division is required to prepare a
plan for such county and any defaulting local governmental units
within it and recommend the plan to the Administration Commission
which has the authority to adopt it.' 37 Thus, as in the case of state-
imposed critical area regulations under the Environmental Land Act,
the threat of control by a higher level of government should provide a
powerful incentive for each local government to adopt a comprehen-
sive plan.
Another major feature of the local planning Act is its prescription
of local plan content. The Act imposes three types of substantive re-
quirements: mandatory general elements, mandatory specific ele-
ments, and optional specific elements.' 38 Among the mandatory
general elements is the stipulation that each local plan must include a
specific policy statement of the relationship between the locality's de-
velopment and the comprehensive plans of the county, adjacent mu-
nicipalities and counties, the region, and the state.' 39  The nine
mandatory specific elements for each local plan include a future land
use element, a conservation element, a housing element, and an inter-
governmental coordination element.140 In addition to the mandatory
136. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(2), (3) (1977).
137. Id § 163.3167(4), (5).
138. Id § 163.3177.
139. Id § 163.3177(4). The other mandatory general elements are (1) the plan
must consist of descriptive materials, written or graphic, that prescribe principles,
guidelines, and standards for development of the area; (2) the various elements of the
plan must be consistent with each other, (3) the plan must be economically feasible
and the economic assumptions on which it is based must be analyzed and included as
part of the plan; and (4) the plan and its various elements must contain policy recom-
mendations for their implementation. Id § 163.3177(l)-(3), (5).
140. Id § 163.3177(6). The other mandatory specific elements are a traffic circu-
lation element, a general sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, and potable water ele-
ment, a recreation and open space element, a coastal zone protection element (for
local governments located in part or whole in the coastal zone), and a utility element.
Id In addition, comprehensive plans of local government units with populations
greater than 50,000 must also include a mass transit element, and a port, aviation and
related facilities element, both of which may be included within the mandatory traffic
circulation element. Id § 163.3177(6)(j), (7)(a)-(b).
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general and specific elements, each local government has the option
of including other specific elements in its plan. 4 '
A third significant aspect of the local planning act is the legal rela-
tionship which it creates between local plans and local land develop-
ment regulations. The Act establishes the local comprehensive plan
as the primary instrument for regulating land use in Florida. After
the adoption of a local plan, all local land development regulations
and all local development orders must be consistent with the local
plan.' 42 Local governments cannot evade the consistency require-
ment by electing not to regulate land use. The local planning Act
requires each local government to implement its comprehensive plan
through "the adoption and enforcement of appropriate local regula-
tions on the development of land and waters."'
t43
How does the local planning process interact with the state com-
prehensive plan and the Environmental Land Act's regulatory proc-
ess in critical areas? The development of a well-coordinated
comprehensive planning and regulatory strategy is highly desirable
and probably essential if state and regional values are to be promoted
and protected in critical areas. Formulation and implementation of
such a strategy is not easily accomplished since each critical area is
likely to encompass several local governmental entities. As previ-
ously mentioned, the Environmental Land Act's reliance solely on
state review of locally prepared regulations is not consistent with the
need for a comprehensive regional approach. Similarly, the local
planning act's mandate of local rather than regional plans presents a
potential barrier to an effective area-wide approach in critical areas.
Fortunately, however, the local planning act, unlike the Environmen-
tal Land Act, recognizes the need for state, regional and local coordi-
nation.
An express purpose of the local planning act is "to encourage and
assure coordination" of the planning activities of local governments,
141. Optional elements expressly mentioned by the act are mass transit, port and
aviation facihties, nonautomotive traffic circulation, off-street parking, public services
and facilities, public buildings, community design, area redevelopment, safety, histor-
ical and scenic preservation, and an economic plan. Id § 163.3177(7)(a)-(k). Addi-
tionally, the Act provides that the plan may include "[sluch other elements as may be
peculiar to. and necessary for, the area concerned and as are added to the comprehen-
sive plan by the governing body upon the recommendation of the local planning
agency." Id § 163.3177(7)(1).
142 Id § 163.3194(1).
143. Id § 163.3201.
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regional agencies and the state."' To this end, the Act requires that
each proposed comprehensive plan, plan element, and most plan
amendments be submitted to the Division of State Planning and the
appropriate regional planning agency for review and comment on the
proposed plan's possible effects on the state, regional and county
comprehensive plans.45 In the case of municipalities the proposed
plan must also be submitted to the county for review and comment.
Within sixty days after receipt of the local proposal, each of the re-
viewing agencies must submit to local government its written com-
ments, including any objections and recommended modifications.
The local government must respond in writing to any such objections
within four weeks after their receipt.' 46
A serious weakness of this coordinating mechanism is the purely
advisory nature of state, regional and county review. Local govern-
ment is not required to modify its plan proposals to satisfy the objec-
tions of the reviewing agencies. The comments, recommendations
and objections of the reviewing agencies and the local response, how-
ever, become a part of the public record of the matter and are admis-
sible in any proceeding in which the comprehensive plan is at
issue.' 47 Conceivably, therefore, state, regional, and county objec-
tions could constitute a potent weapon for attacking the validity of a
local plan. Notwithstanding this possibility, a more direct and bind-
ing form of state or regional review seems appropriate, especially in
critical areas where officially recognized state and regional interests
are at stake.
The Environmental Land Act may provide a more effective means
for enforcing coordination of state, regional and local plans in critical
areas. In designating a critical area, the Administration Commission
is required to adopt principles for guiding development in the area.
Assuming this authorization does not constitute an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative authority, an issue discussed in Part IV, it is broad
enough to permit adoption of the principle that all local plans must
be consistent or coordinated with the state and regional plans and
with each other.' 48 The state's authority to review and disapprove
local plans for compliance with such a principle may be questionable
144. Id § 163.3161(4).
145. Id § 163.3184(1), (2).
146. Id § 153.3184(2).
147. Id § 163.3184(5).
148. The only statutory restriction on the Administration Commission's duty and
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since the Act provides only that the Division shall review locally pre-
pared "land development regulations" which are not defined to in-
clude local comprehensive plans.'4 9 Pursuant to its power to
disapprove local regulations, though, the Division could accomplish
indirectly what it is not authorized to do directly. A possible ground
for disapproving local regulations might be that the regulations are
not based on an adequately coordinated local plan as required by the
guiding principles. If a local government failed to submit acceptable
regulations, the Administration Commission could then impose regu-
lations based on the state comprehensive plan.
Since each local government is required to adopt land develop-
ment regulations that are consistent with its comprehensive plan, it is
anomalous to provide for binding state review of such regulations in
critical areas without similar review of the underlying plan.'5° The
Environmental Land Act should be amended to provide that the
guiding development principles shall require local plans and regula-
tions to be consistent with the state comprehensive plan and with
each other and for binding state or regional review of local compre-
hensive plans, as well as development regulations, in critical areas.
In the absence of such provisions, it will be difficult for the require-
ments of the three acts to coalesce into a well-coordinated, compre-
hensive system for regulating critical areas.
C. Adjudication
The final phase of the Florida critical areas process is the resolu-
tion of disputes arising out of local government's administration of
state approved land development regulations. Like the Model Code,
Florida rejected direct judicial review of local regulatory decisions in
favor of intermediate state administrative review. But in sharp con-
trast to the Model Code, which proposes creation of an independent,
appointed state review board,' 5 ' the Environmental Land Act vests
the adjudicatory function in the Florida governor and cabinet mem-
power to adopt "principles for guiding development of the area is the prohibition
against development moratoria. Id § 380.05(l)(b).
149. Id § 380.05(5), (6). "Land development regulations" are defined to "include
local zoning, subdivision, building, and other regulations controlling the development
of land." Id § 380.031(7).
150 For a similar criticism of the Model Code's critical areas regulatory process,
see D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 72-74.
151. MODEL CODE, supra note 26, § 7-501-504.
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bers, the same officials who designate critical areas. When reviewing
local regulatory decisions, the governor and cabinet sit as the Florida
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission.' 52
While Florida's plural executive body may be well-suited for the
legislative role of critical areas designator, it is not an appropriate
repository of the adjudicatory power. As previously observed, the
governor and cabinet, as publicly elected political figures with a
broad range of official duties, have neither the time nor the expertise
for making highly complex and specialized land use adjudications.153
While the Commission's use of hearing officers renders its designa-
tion as adjudicator less objectionable on competency grounds, it also
effectively transforms the Commission into a rubber stamp for the
recommended orders of administrative hearing officers who have no
more time, staff or expertise in such matters than judicial judges." 4
Furthermore, designating the governor and cabinet as the Adjudi-
catory Commission creates a highly politicized institutional arrange-
ment for reviewing local decisions. The governor and cabinet also
constitute the Administration Commission, a part of the Florida De-
partment of Administration in which the Division of State Planning
is located.'55 The Division, which has the duty to make critical area
recommendations to the Administration Commission, also has the
power to appeal local critical area development decisions to the Ad-
152. FLA. STAT. § 380.031(l), .07 (1977).
153. Pelham, supra note 102, at 829-30.
154. Proponents of state administrative review of local land use decisions have
contended that the judiciary lacks the time, staff, and expertise required to resolve
complex land use problems. See, e.g., Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land- Use
Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 524-26 (1957).
155. FLA. STAT. §§ 20.31(2)-(3), 380.031(1). The Reporters' Notes to § 7-501 of
the Model Code, supra note 26, state: "It is important that the [State Land Adjudica-
tory] Board be independent of the State Land Planning Agency so that the Board may
examine the position taken by all parties on an impartial basis without being subject
to undue influence by the Agency." It seems equally important that the State Land
Planning Agency be independent of the State Land Adjudicatory Board, a situation
that did not currently exist in Florida prior to July 1, 1979.
After this Article entered the publication process, the Florida legislature enacted
legislation reorganizing the various state agencies involved in the critical areas proc-
ess. Effective July 1, 1979, the powers, duties, and functions of the Division of State
Planning were transferred from the Department of Administration to the Department
of Community Affairs, 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-190, §§ 48, 153. Since the Department
of Community Affairs is headed by a Secretary appointed by the Governor alone
rather than by the Governor and cabinet, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.18(1) (West Supp.
1978), this arrangement should give the State Land Planning Agency greater indepen-
dence.
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judicatory Commission.- 6 Consequently, the Division may fre-
quently be a party to adjudicatory proceedings before its
administrative superiors, a situation which does not encourage in-
dependent and unbiased action by the Division. Utilization of hear-
ing officers does not eliminate the potential for conflict of interest and
political pressure inherent in this arrangement. The Division of Ad-
ministrative Hearings, which supplies the hearing officers, is also lo-
cated within the Department of Administration and headed by a
director appointed by the Administration Commission. 57 Clearly
this arrangement is not conducive either to the actual or apparent
fairness and impartiality that is essential to the integrity and legiti-
macy of the adjudicatory process.
The Administration Commission has jurisdiction to review all lo-
cal development orders issued in areas of critical state concern. 158 As
defined by the Environmental Land Act, "development order" in-
cludes "any order granting, denying or granting with conditions an
application for a development permit."' 59 "Development permit," in
turn, is defined broadly to include "any building permit, zoning per-
mit, plat approval, or rezoning, certification, variance, or other action
having the effect of permitting development."'' 60
Despite this express statutory conferral of jurisdiction over zoning,
the issue generated much controversy during the initial stages of the
Act's implementation, with the Division of State Planning taking the
surprising position that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over local
zoning. 6' A recent court decision involving a local DRI develop-
ment order, however, seems to reject the Division's position. In Gen-
156 Id § 380.05(l)(a), .07(2).
157 Id §§ 20.31(3)(f), 120.65(1).
Note, however, that FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.66(1) (West Supp. 1978) prohibits ex
parie communications from an agency head or member to the hearing officer or to the
agency head after the agency head receives a recommended order from the hearing
officer. Also note that in 1979 the Florida Legislature amended FLA. STAT.
§ 120.65(1) (1977) to provide that the Division of Administrative Hearings "shall not
be subject to control, supervision, or direction by the Department of Administration."
1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-190, § 45.
158 Id § 380.07(2) provides, in part, that whenever a "local government issues
any development order in any area of critical state concern," an appropriate party
"may appeal the order to the Florida land and water adjudicatory commission."
159. Id § 380.031(2).
160. Id § 380,031(3).
161. See Pelham, supra note 105, at 831-32.
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eral Electric Credit Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,' 62 the court
expressly held that an appeal from local DRI development orders,
including DRI zoning decisions, to the Commission is a prerequisite
to judicial review, 163 thereby impliedly ruling that the Commission
has jurisdiction to review local zoning orders. Moreover, in the first
and only appeal taken from a local critical area development order
thus far, the Adjudicatory Commission accepted jurisdiction over a
local zoning decision.'"
The Commission's jurisdiction may be invoked by the filing of a
notice of appeal by a proper party within thirty days after the local
order is rendered.' 65 Only four parties are expressly permitted by the
Environmental Land Act to appeal local critical area development
orders to the Commission: the Division of State Planning, the re-
gional planning agency, the owner, and the developer. 166 Attempts
to expand the statutory boundaries of standing through judicial con-
162. 346 So. 2d 1049 (1977). The case involved Dade County's denial of an appli-
cation for rezoning and development approval of a DRI. Prior to taking an appeal to
the Adjudicatory Commission, the developer petitioned the Dade County Circuit
Court for judicial review of the denial. Holding that denial of development permits,
including rezonings, for DRI must be appealed to the Adjudicatory Commission prior
to judicial review, the circuit court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. The developer then appealed the lower court's dismissal which
was subsequently affirmed by the appellate court. Id at 1051-52, 1055.
163. Id at 1053-54. In rejecting the developer's contention that appeals to the
Adjudicatory Commission are optional, the court stated:
Were we to hold that appeals to the ... Adjudicatory Commission are simply
options to be utilized or ignored according to the whim of individual owners or
developers, we would frustrate the obvious intent of the Legislature, which was
to allow the fullest possible input by regional and state authorities into areas of
development which will have extra-local impact.
Id at 1054.
164. In re City of Key West Ordinance Nos. 76-8 and 76-12, No. 76-9 (FLWAC,
filed November 29, 1977) (A docket of all critical area appeals filed with the Florida
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) is maintained in the offices of
the Department of Administration in Tallahassee, Florida). This case is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 222-226 infra.
According to the Chief of the Florida Bureau of Land and Water Management, the
Division has now receded from its earlier position that the Adjudicatory Commission
lacks jurisdiction over local zoning decisions. Interview with James May, supra note
117.
165. Fla. Stat. § 380.07(2) (1977). "Rendered" has been judicially construed to
mean the date on which the local government transmits by mail or otherwise the
order to the Division or the affected owner or developer. Fox v. South Fla. Regional
Plan. Council, 327 So. 2d 56, 58, cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1976).
166. Id
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struction of the Act have failed.' 67 Thus, the statutory limitation on
standing, much stricter than the standing requirements of the Model
Code and other similar state legislation, 6 ' diminishes the signifi-
cance of the Commission's broad grant of jurisdiction.
After the filing of a timely appeal by a proper party, the initial
question is whether review by the Adjudicatory Commission shall be
de novo or on the record. Although this issue has important procedu-
ral and substantive implications, the Environmental Land Act sup-
plies no definitive answer. It provides only that the Adjudicatory
Commission shall hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act, and "that the Commission
shall encourage the submission of appeals on the record made below
in cases in which the development order was issued after a full and
complete hearing before the local government."' 69 This ambiguous
provision has created confusion since it is not clear whether the duty
to "encourage" includes the power to require appeals on the record if
a de novo hearing is requested by the appellant. Substantively, the
issue is significant because the Commission's power to review, reverse
or modify local decisions is much greater in a de novo proceeding
than in a record appeal. Hopefully, this vital issue has been resolved
167. See Sarasota County v. General Dev. Corp., 325 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App 1976) (holding that a county does not have standing to appeal a municipal de-
velopment order rendered by a municipality located within the county); Sarasota
County v. Beker Phosphate Corp., 322 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that a county has no standing to appeal a local development order issued by
another county approving a development located entirely within the latter county).
168. Under the Model Code, supra note 26, §§ 7-502(2), 9-103(l)-(2), the owner or
applicant, the local government, and any other person who became a party at the
local hearing has standing to appeal. Several categories of persons, including owners
of land within 500 feet of the development site, are entitled to become parties as of
right at the local hearing. Id § 2-304(5). Additionally, the presiding officer at the
local hearing is authorized to permit any other person to appear as a party upon a
showing of a "'significant interest" in the matter. Id § 2-304(5). Cf. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 197.300(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1977) (permitting a county, city, special district, state
agency, or a "person or group of persons whose interests are substantially affected" to
appeal any local comprehensive plan provision or implementing regulation to the
state reviewing agency).
169 FLA. STAT. § 380.07(3) (1977). Cf MODEL CODE, supra note 26, § 7-503(1),
which provides: "A State Land Adjudicatory Board shall grant or deny development
permission on the record made before the Land Development Agency." The Model
Code Reporters elaborate on this provision in their Notes: "It is not the intent. . . to
authorize the taking of additional evidence by the Board. If additional evidence is
needed the proceeding should be remanded to the Land Development Agency with
directions to hear such evidence." Id at 289.
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by the recent case of General Development Corp. v. Florida Land and
Water Adjudicatory Commission,170 in which the court held that the
Commission's hearing officer may order a de novo hearing if the lo-
cal proceeding is not conducted in accordance with the Florida
APA.
17 1
The substantive criteria for evaluating local critical area decisions
are deficient. In reviewing local decisions the Adjudicatory Commis-
sion is limited to a determination of whether the local order is consis-
tent with the guiding principles and implementing regulations. 72 As
Professor Daniel Mandelker, in his trenchant analysis of the Model
Code has observed, these principles and regulations probably do not
give the state review agency sufficient guidance and should be supple-
mented by independent substantive review standards similar to those
established for local DRI decisions. 73 Requiring all local plans, reg-
170. 386 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The case arose out of an appeal
to the Adjudicatory Commission, by a regional planning agency and the Division of a
favorable municipal DRI order. The regional planning agency's request for a de
novo hearing was opposed by the developer. In a prehearing order the hearing officer
granted the regional agency's request on the ground that the local hearing did not
satisfy the requirements of the APA. The developer then petitioned the appellate
court for review of the prehearing order. Id at 1324-25.
171. Id at 1325-26. While noting that ELWMA does provide that the Commis-
sion shall encourage record appeals, the court also observed that the act requires the
Commission to hold hearings pursuant to the APA. The APA makes no provision for
appellate review proceedings by administrative agencies; rather, it establishes proce-
dures, including sworn testimony, cross-examination, and the submission of any rele-
vant evidence, which govern all administrative hearings. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the Commission's hearing officer may require a full evidentiary hear-
ing in all DRI appeals. However, the court also ruled that testimony and exhibits
given under oath and subject to cross-examination in local DRI hearings must be
admitted into evidence at the appellate hearing, and suggested that in appropriate
cases the record of a full and complete local hearing might be the only evidence nec-
essary to a decision by the Commission. Id
172. The Environmental Land Act contains no other substantive criteria for eval-
uating local critical area decisions. See FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1977). In City of Key
West Ordinance Nos. 76-8, 76-12, supra note 164, the first appeal of a local critical
areas decision, the Adjudicatory Commission concluded as a matter of law that the
guiding development principles and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto are the
sole criteria for local development orders. Id Final Order, at 8.
Similarly, the Model Code provides no other substantive criteria for state review of
local critical area decisions. See MODEL CODE, supra note 26, § 7-207. The absence
of independent substantive review standards has been criticized by Mandelker, supra
note 1, at 79, who points out that the guiding development principles and regulations
"may not give the [state review] board enough precise guidance in conducting its
review of local development control decisions."
173. D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 79.
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ulations and development orders to conform to the state comprehen-
sive plan, a recommendation put forth in the previous section, would
alleviate this problem. As suggested in Part IV, in the absence of
additional statutory standards or a provision for legislative review of
the guiding development principles, the delegation of adjudicatory
power to the Commission is probably unconstitutional.
In reviewing local decisions, the Adjudicatory Commission will al-
ways be bound by the substantial evidence rule.17 4 If the appeal is
conducted on the local record, the Commission's hearing officer can
recommend reversal of the local order only upon a finding that the
order is not supported by substantial competent evidence. If the ap-
peal is de novo, the hearing officer issues a recommended order based
upon the preponderance of the evidence adduced at a new adminis-
trative trial, a procedure that allows the hearing officer to reweigh the
evidence and render a decision independent of the decision made by
local government. In either event, the Adjudicatory Commission it-
self is bound by the substantial evidence rule; it can reject the hearing
officer's findings of fact only by determining, after a review of the
entire record, that the findings are not supported by substantial com-
petent evidence.' 75
Within the constraints of the substantial evidence rule, the Com-
mission's remedial powers are coextensive with those of local govern-
ment in issuing the initial development order. Both the Commission
and local government are authorized to grant or deny permission to
develop in critical areas pursuant to the standards of the Environ-
mental Land Act and may impose conditions on the granting of a
permit."' As a practical matter, the Commission's powers may ex-
ceed those expressly granted by statute. The administrative appellate
process gives the Commission, and those who invoke its jurisdiction,
174. See Pelham, supra note 105, at 836-37 (discussing the substantial evidence
rule).
175 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(l)(b) (West Supp. 1974-78) provides in part:
The agency may adopt the recommended order as the agency's final order. The
agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law and inter-
pretation of administrative rules in the recommended order, but may not reject
or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of
the complete record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of
fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings
on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of
law
See also Pelham, supra note 105, at 837.
176. FLA. STAT. § 380.031(2), .07(2) & (5) (1977).
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the leverage to negotiate settlements imposing conditions and restric-
tions that might not be supported by the weight of the evidence ad-
duced in an adjudicatory proceeding. Actually, therefore, the
adjudicatory process may frequently consist of a series of negotiating
sessions that, if successful, dispense with the need for a formal adju-
dication of the dispute by the Commission.' 77
The Adjudicatory Commission's decisions are subject to judicial
review as provided in the Florida APA. The scope of such review is
limited to the record compiled before the Adjudicatory Commission.
Moreover, in reviewing the administrative record, the court is bound
by the substantial evidence rule."I Hence, the judiciary's major con-
tribution to individual critical area development decisions probably
will be the prevention of wholly arbitrary and unreasonable decisions
by the Adjudicatory Commission. 179
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FLORIDA CRITICAL AREAS
TECHNIQUE
The seven-year history of the Florida critical areas technique is a
checkered one. Utilization of the technique has ranged from legisla-
tive designation to official administrative designation to unofficial ad-
ministrative designation. The scope and complexity of the regulatory
177. For a discussion of how most DRI appeals have resulted in negotiated settle-
ments prior to a final hearing before the Adjudicatory Commission, see Pelham, stpra
note 105, at 838-40.
178. FLA. STAT. AN-N. § 120.68(5) (West Supp. 1974-78) provides that judicial re-
view of agency action is limited to the agency's written order and the record compiled
by the agency in accordance with the APA.
Id § 120.68(10) provides in part:
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency ... the court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The court shall, however, set aside
agency action or remand the case to the agency if it finds that the agency's action
depends on any finding that is not supported by competent substantial evidence
in the record.
179. The author has previously made a similar observation about the role of the
judiciary in reviewing individual DRI decisions rendered by the Adjudicatory Com-
mission. Pelham, supra note 105, at 848. While Florida courts have not yet had occa-
sion to review the merits of a critical areas or DRI decision, they have not been
reluctant to reverse other agency decisions not based upon substantial competent evi-
dence. See, e.g., City of Plant City v. Mayo, 337 So. 2d 966, 975 (Fla. 1976) (setting
aside an order of the Florida Public Service Commission on the ground that it was
not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record as required by the
APA).
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systems established in the designated areas also vary widely. Consis-
tency characterizes only one aspect of the Florida program: with one
notable exception, the state has used its critical areas technique as a
natural resource management tool in primarily rural, environmen-
tally sensitive areas. An examination of each of the areas not only
illustrates the difficulties of implementing, but also illuminates some
of the strengths and weaknesses of the comprehensive approach to
critical area management.
A. Legislative Designation: The Big Cypress
The administrative designation process described in Part II is cum-
bersome and time-consuming. Assembling the information necessary
to support a recommendation by the Division of State Planning and a
designation by the Administration, with due consideration given to
the five-percent limitation, cannot be speedily accomplished. Per-
suading the Administration Commission of both the merits and polit-
ical feasibility of a proposed designation may further prolong the
process. Additionally, even if the Administration Commission offi-
cially designates an area of critical state concern, the adoption of crit-
ical area development regulations in accordance with the
Environmental Land Act, which does not permit development mora-
toria or interim controls, may take twelve months. Thus, the admin-
istrative designation process is not well-suited for emergency
situations, a reality that was implicitly recognized by the Florida leg-
islature only one year after its enactment of the Environmental Land
Act.
The Big Cypress presented an emergency situation in 1973. Con-
sisting of 1.5 million acres in southwest Florida, the Big Cypress con-
tains an abundance of natural resources of state and national
importance. First, the area is underlaid by the shallow aquifer of
southwest Florida which provides a source of fresh water for urban-
izing communities along Florida's southwest coast, irrigation water
for agricultural use, and surface water for the Everglades National
Park. Second, the area includes the Federal Big Cypress National
Fresh Water Reserve and the Everglades National Park; the former
contains over 500,000 acres of important wildlife habitat and the lat-
ter possesses unique biological, historical, educational, and recrea-
tional resources which attract almost two million visitors a year.
Third, the area encompasses estuarine fisheries and related ecosys-
tems that comprise the most important commercial and sport fishing
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grounds in Florida.'8 0 These resources faced imminent danger in
1973 from a variety of development pressures, including the proposed
location of an interstate highway through the area.' 8 ' Given the ur-
gency of the area's problems, the administrative critical areas process
did not offer a satisfactory solution.
Thus, in 1973 the Florida legislature partially by-passed the ad-
ministrative process by directly conferring critical area status on the
Big Cypress and exempted it from the five-percent limitation.'8 2
Finding that the Big Cypress "is an area containing and having a
significant impact upon environmental and natural resources of re-
gional and statewide importance,"'8 3 the legislature, by amendment
to the Environmental Land Act, commanded the Administration
Commission to establish definitive boundaries for the area pursuant
to the recommendations of the Division.'84 In addition, the legisla-
ture exempted the Big Cypress designation from the statutory proce-
dures for submission and approval of local regulations and
authorized the Administration Commission to adopt, with or without
modification, land development regulations proposed by the Division
simultaneously with its boundary recommendation.'-
In recommending precise boundaries for the area, the Division was
guided only by the statutory definition of the Big Cypress as the area
depicted on a specifically referenced boundary map "together with
such contiguous land and water areas as are ecologically linked with
the Everglades National Park, . . . the estuarine fisheries of South
Florida, or the freshwater aquifer of South Florida."" 6 The Division
construed this language broadly. In its initial recommendation to the
Administration Commission, the Division recommended that three-
fourths of the entire Big Cypress watershed, containing about 1.2 mil-
lion acres and several municipalities, be included in the critical area
180. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING, STATE
OF FLORIDA, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BIG CYPRESS AREA
OF CRITICAL STATE CONCERN 13-23 (October 1973) [hereinafter cited as BIG
CYPRESS FINAL REPORT].
181. See L. CARTER, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 246-48 (1974). This book is an
excellent study of Florida's environmental problems, including those in the Big
Cypress.
182. FLA. STAT. § 380.055(3), (4) (1977).
183. Id § 380.055(2).
184. Id § 380.055(3).
185. Id § 380.055(4).
186. Id § 380.055(3).
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and that stringent development regulations be imposed on the area.
Following a storm of protest from private citizens, state legislators,
and state executive officials, the recommendation was withdrawn.
87
Subsequently, the Division submitted a substantially scaled-down
recommendation.
As finally adopted by the Administration Commission, the bound-
aries of the Big Cypress critical area encompassed lands in three
counties constituting only about fifty percent of the total Big Cypress
area. All municipalities and urbanizing areas were excluded. 88 Re-
flecting the narrow natural resource considerations that prompted
designation, the land development regulations adopted by the Com-
mission are extremely limited in scope, focusing almost exclusively
on the quantity, quality and flow of water in the area. Within these
parameters, the regulations are fairly restrictive.' 89 Because the area
has experienced little development since the designation, however,
there has been little permitting activity and no appeals from local
decisions to the Adjudicatory Commission.' 90
The Big Cypress was not a true test of the Florida administrative
critical areas technique. Legislative designation eliminated many of
the political and legal problems encountered in subsequent adminis-
trative designations. Furthermore, administrative exclusion of all ur-
banizing areas from the designated boundaries reduced substantially
the potential impact of, and political opposition to, the designation.
Nonetheless, the intense opposition to a more extensive designation
was an ominous portent for using the administrative designation
process.
B. Administrative Designation
Administrative designation has proceeded slowly but steadily in
187. L. CARTER, supra note 181, at 249-54.
188 BIG CYPRESS FINAL REPORT, supra note 180, at 24, 66. Fewer than 50,000
people reside in the Big Cypress area. Id at 10.
189. See 8 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-3.06 to .09 (Big Cypress development regula-
tions establishing performance standards for site alteration, drainage, transportation,
and structure installation in the area). Id 22F-3.06 is typical of the regulations; it
limits site alteration to 10% of the total site size with "total site" defined as "land
which is under common ownership or is part of a common plan of development,
rentel. advertising or sale." Id 22F-303(8).
190. Interview with Stephen Fox, Senior Planner and Critical Areas Section
Leader, Division of State Planning, Bureau of Land & Water Management, Division
of State Planning, State of Florida, m Tallahassee, Florida (July 21, 1978).
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Florida. During the first five years of the program, the Division of
State Planning received seventy-nine critical area nominations. Pro-
ceeding without any officially promulgated administrative standards
for designating critical areas, the Division concluded that about forty
of the nominated areas could not be addressed under the Environ-
mental Land Act. After requesting additional information, the Divi-
sion rejected about fifteen more nominations for the same reason.
Two nominated areas were officially designated as critical areas by
the Administration Commission, one was unofficially designated by
the Division, and six have been combined into one nomination which
the Division may recommend for official designation by the Commis-
sion after the constitutionality of the program has been settled. Ap-
proximately fifteen nominations are still pending as potential critical
areas. 191
1. Official Administrative Designation No. I.- The Green Swamp.
Florida's first administratively designated critical area is another ex-
periment in natural resource management. Located in the central
highlands of Florida, the Green Swamp area "is a composite of
swamps separated by flatwoods, low hills and ridges" encompassing
wholly or partially five counties and five municipalities.' 92 As in the
case of the Big Cypress, natural resource considerations prompted
designation of the Green Swamp as a critical area. The Green
Swamp is a major recharge area for the Floridan Aquifer. It annu-
ally contributes over eighty-one billion gallons of ground-water
recharge to this important aquifer which underlies the entire state
and supplies about seventy percent of all the ground water consumed
in Florida.' 93 Equally important are the wetlands, comprising about
fifty percent of the area, in which five major rivers originate, surface
waters are retained, water quality is improved through natural filter-
ing characteristics, and valuable wildlife habitat are located.' 94 An
additional consideration was the existence of water-management fa-
cilities which represent a public investment of 114 million dollars and
provide flood protection and a wide variety of recreational opportu-
191. Id
192. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING, STATE
OF FLORIDA, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED GREEN
SWAMP AREA OF CRITICAL STATE CONCERN 2, 17-18 (June 1974) [hereinafter cited as
The GREEN SWAMP REPORT].
193. Id at 20, 22-23.
194. Id at 25-27.
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nities. " 5
Uncoordinated development posed a serious threat to these re-
sources and investments. Development of the area would entail sub-
stantial drainage, which could lower water levels, decrease available
aquifer recharge water, reduce the water retention and filtering capa-
bilities of the wetlands, destroy wildlife habitat and recreational facil-
ities, and necessitate redesigning and reconstruction of water-
management facilities.' 96 Therefore, since existing local land devel-
opment regulations were deemed inadequate to eliminate such ad-
verse impacts, the Administration Commission in 1974 designated a
portion of the Green Swamp consisting of about 320,000 acres in two
counties as an area of critical state concern. Like the Big Cypress
designation, the Green Swamp critical area contains no municipali-
ties. "'
Following adoption of the designation rule on July 16, 1974,198 the
Florida APA rulemaking provisions combined with the Environmen-
tal Land Act's self-destruct mechanism to deal the Green Swamp
designation a potentially mortal blow. Under the Environmental
Land Act's time table, critical area regulations must become effective
within twelve months after the designation. Otherwise, the designa-
tion automatically terminates.' 99 When the two constituent county
governments failed to submit acceptable regulations within six
months after the Green Swamp designation, the Division prepared
and recommended regulations to the Administration Commission.2°
Adoption of the proposed rules by the Commission was delayed by
the filing under the APA of an administrative challenge to the valid-
ity of the proposed rules. Consequently, the regulations did not be-
come effective until July 20, 1975, twelve months and four days after
adoption of the designation rule.2°' Previously, on July 15, 1975, the
195. id at 28, 30.
196. The GREEN SWAMP REPORT, supra note 192, at 23-24, 27-28, 30-31. Much of
the development in the vicinity of the area is attributable to the location of the Dis-
neyworld complex on about 30,000 acres of land less than five miles east of the Green
Swamp. Id at 17.
197. Id at 32, 35-36, 46-47; 8 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-5. In 1970 less than 12,000
people resided in the Green Swamp area. Id at 15.
198 8 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-5 (the Green Swamp designation rule).
199. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(12) (1977).
200. Interview with Stephen Fox, supra note 80.
201. Postal Colony Co., Inc. v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977),
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Administration Commission had attempted to prevent the striking of
the "statutory doomsday clock" by adopting the proposed regulations
as emergency rules pursuant to the APA, 0 z a desperation tactic
which failed to save the Green Swamp designation.
Parties to the rule making proceedings before the Adjudicatory
Commission sought judicial review of the regulations in Postal Col-
ony Co., Inc. v. Askew. 203 Although constitutional objections to the
regulations were raised, the court disposed of the matter on statutory
grounds. First, giving full force and effect to the statutory twelve-
month requirement, the court held that the regulations were invalid
because of the Administration Commission's failure to effectuate
them within twelve months after adoption of the designation rule.
The designation was thus automatically and irrevocably termi-
nated.2" Second, the court held that the Commission's attempt to
accelerate the effective date of the regulations by adopting them as
emergency rules pursuant to the APA was also ineffective. According
to the Court, the Commission's finding of immediate danger to the
public health safety, or welfare, a statutory prerequisite to adoption
of emergency rules, was not supported by sufficient evidence.205
Subsequently, in a petition for rehearing the Administration Com-
mission requested the court to reconsider its decision because timely
effectuation of the regulations had been prevented by the intervening
administrative rule challenge. While recognizing the significance of
this circumstance, the court declined to consider it because it had not
been called to the courts attention either in the briefs or oral argu-
ment.2" 6 Additionally, however, the court stated that a reconsidera-
tion was precluded by its decision in another case that the statutory
critical areas designation provisions were unconstitutional.2"7 Thus,
202. Id at 341-42. The APA emergency rulemaking provisions are discussed at
note 95 supra.
203. 348 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
204. Id at 339-40.
205. Id at 340, 342. According to the court, the record was devoid of any evi-
dence of immediate danger to the central Florida water supply, the future condition
of which motivated designation of the Green Swamp. Rather, the only "immediate
danger" cited by the Adjudicatory Commission was its failure to adopt timely the
critical area regulations. Thus, stated the court, "When as here the legislature has
clearly specified the consequence of delay, emergency created wholly by an agency's
failure to take timely action cannot justify extraordinary suspensions or extensions of
the statutory schedule." Id at 342.
206. Id at 343.
207. Cross Key Waterways, Inc. v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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the Green Swamp designation was placed in limbo pending a final
determination by the Florida Supreme Court of its constitutional-
ity.
2 °8
As discussed in Part IV, the Green Swamp designation was invali-
dated by the Florida Supreme Court. Nevertheless, since the
designation has been reinstated by the legislature, the Green Swamp
regulatory system merits some attention. The guiding development
principles adopted by the Administration Commission are primarily
concerned with protection of the area's water resources. Eleven
objectives and an equal number of regulatory guidelines for minimiz-
ing the adverse impact of site alteration, soils, ground water, storm
water runoff, solid waste and structures on water resources comprise
the principles.2" Essentially, the state-imposed regulations establish
a permit system and performance standards for development activi-
ties in the area.2"' As of July, 1978, neither of the two constituent
counties had adopted comprehensive plans,21' so it remains to be
seen what impact Florida's state and local planning legislation will
have on the Green Swamp.
As in the Big Cypress, little regulated development activity is cur-
rently taking place in the Green Swamp. Similarly, no appeals of
local development decisions in the area have been filed with the Ad-
1977). rendered on the same day as the court's opinion on the petition for rehearing,
348 So 2d at 343, declared portions of the Environmental Land Act unconstitutional.
For a detailed analysis of the case, see text accompanying notes 243-45, 289-92 infra.
208. The lower court's decision in the Postal Colony case was appealed to the
Florida Supreme Court and consolidated with the appeal in the Cross Key case, No.
52, 251 (Fla., petition for writ of certiorari filed August 18, 1978).
209. 6 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-5.03. Representative objectives are: "(1) Mini-
mize the adverse impacts of development on resources of the Floridan Aquifer, wet-
lands, and flood-detention areas; (2) Protect the normal quantity, quality and flow of
ground water and surface water which are necessary for the protection of resources of
state and regional concern." Id 22F-5.03(A) (1) & (2). The regulatory guideline for
site platting illustrates the primary thrust of the guidelines: "The platting of land
should be permitted only when such platting commits development to a pattern which
will not result in the alteration of the natural surface water flow regime and which
will not reduce the natural recharge rate to the platted site." Id 22F-5.03(B) (1).
210. See id 22F-6.08, .09 (establishing minimum development standards and per-
mitting requirements for Polk County); 22F-7.07 & .08 (establishing development per-
formance criteria and a permitting system for Lake County).
211. Interview with Robert Kessler, Senior Planner, Bureau of Comprehensive
Planning. Division of State Planning, State of Florida, in Tallahassee, Florida (July
19, 1978). Mr. Kessler is responsible for reviewing proposed local comprehensive
plans pursuant to the Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. See
text accompanying notes 144-47 supra.
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judicatory Commission.2 12 Hence, it is too early to assess the effec-
tiveness of the regulatory and adjudicatory process in this critical
area.
2. OfficialAdministrative Designation No. 2: The Florida Keys. The
Administration Commission significantly expanded the horizons of
the Florida critical areas program in 1975 by officially designating
the Florida Keys, a rapidly developing area, as the state's third area
of critical concern.213 A 130-mile long archipelago of 97 islands lying
off the southeastern tip of Florida, the Keys are an internationally
famous island paradise which has attracted growing numbers of tour-
ists and permanent residents and rapid development. Inevitably, the
Keys have begun "to suffer . . . from their own success. '
2 14
As noted by the Division of State Planning in its recommendation
of critical area status, rapid and largely uncoordinated growth and
development have seriously impaired the ability of constituent local
governments to provide essential urban services and protect the
unique environment of the Keys. Protection of various environmen-
tal, natural and historical resources and substantial public invest-
ments require a coordinated approach to land management which
has not previously existed in the area. Water quality, coral reef com-
munities, and mangrove areas are among the more important natural
resources affected by development activity. Public investments in-
clude the overseas highway, constituting an investment of over 164
million dollars, water supply facilities, costing more than 35 million
dollars, waste treatment facilities, valued at about 22 million dollars,
and the Key West Historical Preservation District, a valuable tourist
attraction which is one of only four areas in Florida designated by
the state legislature as an historical district.215
As designated by the Administration Commission, the Florida
Keys critical area contains about 70,000 acres in south Monroe
County, Florida. Included within the designated area are four mu-
nicipalities.216 Thus, the critical area includes not only rapidly devel-
oping unincorporated areas but also four incorporated towns. These
212. Interview with Stephen Fox, supra note 80.
213. 6 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-8.
214. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING, STATE
OF FLORIDA, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED FLORIDA
KEYS AREA OF CRITICAL STATE CONCERN 2, 13-15, 23-26 (1974).
215. Id at 28-30.
216. Id at 42. In 1973 the estimated population of Monroe County, only a part of
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facts made the Florida Keys the most controversial of the state's criti-
cal areas and produced a broad scale constitutional attack on the En-
vironmental Land Act and the Florida Keys designation.
Not surprisingly, the guiding principles and land development reg-
ulations adopted for the Florida Keys are much more comprehensive
and complex than those for the Big Cypress and the Green Swamp.
The guiding principles address not only natural resources such as
water quality and tidal mangroves but also historical resources and
public investments. They require each local government within the
area to adopt a plan and policies for future land use, a community
impact assessment ordinance for major developments,2 17 and site al-
teration regulations. In addition, the guidelines direct affected local
governments to create special zoning districts around the Key West
Naval Air Station and require the City of Key West to adopt an his-
torical preservation plan for the Key West Historical Preservation
District.2" 8 Each of the local governments in the area have adopted
regulations complying with the guiding principles;2" 9 however, as of
July, 1978, only one local government had adopted any part of the
comprehensive plan required by the Florida local planning Act.22°
The Florida Keys have a much higher level of development and
which is encompassed within the Florida Keys critical area, was only about 56,000.
Id. at 14.
217. 6 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 22F-8.03B.(l)(d) sets forth as a guiding development
principle that
[a] community impact statement should be submitted and approved prior to the
issuance of zoning and rezoning orders or site plan approval for the following
developments: 1. any development which includes building in excess of 45 feet
in height; 2. any intensive land uses including residential uses of 10 or more
dwellings per acre or 50 or more total dwelling units; and 3. all business, com-
mercial or industrial uses or 5 or more acres.
The purpose of the statement is "to enable local governmental officials to determine
the proposed development's favorable or unfavorable impact on the environment,
natural resources, economy and the potential of the project to meet local or regional
housing needs." Id Thus, this requirement could partially alleviate at least in the
Florida Keys, the Environmental Land Act's failure to subject DRI in critical areas to
the DRI regulatory process, a problem discussed in the text accompanying notes 105-
110 supra.
218. Id 22F-8.03.
219. See id 22F-9 (regulations for Monroe County); 22F-10 (regulations for City
of Key Colony Beach); 22F- I1 (regulations for City of Layton); 22F-12 (regulations
for City of Key West); 22F-13 (regulations for City of North Key Largo Beach).
220 Monroe County had completed the land use element of its comprehensive
plan. None of the four municipalities had adopted any plan element. Interview with
Robert Kessler, supra note 211.
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regulatory activity than do the Big Cypress and the Green Swamp.
Nevertheless, according to one state official, most potential problems
in the area have been resolved on an informal basis. Following its
review of local development orders, the Division has been successful
with one exception, in persuading local governments to modify objec-
tionable orders without the necessity of an appeal.22'
The exception was In re City of Key West Ordinance Nos. 76-8 and
76-12,222 the first appeal of a local critical areas development order
to the Adjudicatory Commission. The case arose out of the enact-
ment of two local ordinances, one granting a rezoning and the other a
variance for property located within the Key West Historic Preserva-
tion District. Located on a street which served as a buffer between
the historical district and an adjacent light industrial district, the
property was rezoned from HP-2 (historical preservation district) to
M-1 (light industrial and warehousing district) so that it could be
used by the owner for outdoor storage of lumber and building sup-
plies in connection with its lumber yard in the adjoining M-1 district.
The variance permitted the owner to construct a wall around the
property in contravention of the city's setback requirements.223 Al-
leging that the two ordinances violated the guiding development
principles for the Florida Keys and the critical area regulations of the
City of Key West regarding historic preservation, the Division ap-
pealed the two ordinances to the Commission.224
The Commission denied the appeal. While acknowledging that a
rezoning to M-1 "could per se violate the integrity of the historical
preservation district if it were done in another portion of the district,"
the Commission found that the rezoning in question did not violate
the spirit of the district because of the property's location on the
boundary between the historic and light industrial districts. 225 In re-
sponse to the state's contention that approval of the local actions
could lead to further violations of the district's integrity by the owner,
the Commission observed that construction of new structures or dis-
mantling of existing ones would require additional local permits, the
issuance of which could also be appealed by the Division. Conse-
quently, the Commission concluded that the Division had failed to
221. Interview with Stephen Fox, supra note 80.
222. No. 76-9 (FLWAC, Nov. 29, 1977).
223. Id Slip opinion at 3-4.
224. Id at 1-2, 4-5.
225. Id at 6.
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establish that the local ordinances violated the applicable guiding de-
velopment principles and critical area regulations.226
In re City of Key West is hardly an auspicious beginning for the
critical areas adjudicatory process. Given the relatively minor devia-
tions from existing zoning patterns in the area and the innocuousness
of the proposed uses, one wonders why the Division chose this partic-
ular case to inaugurate the state administrative review process for
critical areas. Perhaps it was intended as a signal to local government
that the Division will be vigilant in policing local development ac-
tions in the Florida Keys. Whatever the Division's motivation and
notwithstanding the undistinguished factual background, the case il-
lustrates the potential of the state review mechanism for protecting
state interests in areas of critical state concern.
3. Unofficial Administrative Designation. The Apalachicola River and
Bay System. In 1977, the Division announced a fourth albeit unoffi-
cial critical area designation-the Apalachicola River and Bay Sys-
tem ("the System"). 227 Comprising about 2,000 square miles in six
counties in the central panhandle of Florida, the system extends from
the Alabama and Georgia-Florida boundaries to barrier islands off
the Florida Gulf coast.228 Since the area is predominatly rural, its
designation marks the advent of another experiment in resource
management although some resource-related public investment con-
siderations are also present. The System, a highly integrated network
of "uplands, freshwater swamps, coastal lowlands, and one of the
most productive bays in Florida," contains an abundance of natural
resources, including commercial fisheries, wildlife habitat and
beaches. Major public investments in the area include a state and
federally financed oyster bar rehabilitation program in Apalachicola
Bay, a navigable, heavily traveled channel in the river which is main-
tamined by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, thousands of acres of
environmentally endangered lands recently purchased from private
landowners by the State of Florida, and numerous public parks and
recreational facilities. 229
226. Id at 7, 9.
227. See DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING,
STATE OF FLORIDA, THE APALACHICOLA RIVER & BAY SYSTEM: A FLORIDA RE-
SOURCE (April 1977) [hereinafter cited as THE APALACHICOLA RIVER REPORT].
228. Id at 41-42.
229. Id at 4-18, 21.
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Although the System was nominated for official designation as a
critical area by the Florida Department of Pollution Control,230 the
Division concluded that an official designation was premature, de-
spite increased development pressures, construction of an interstate
highway through the area, and the proposed construction of a dam
across the river by the Corp of Engineers.23 Ostensibly, the Divi-
sion's decision was based on the perceived inability of local govern-
ments in the area to comply with critical area regulatory
requirements, the devotion of eighty percent of the land in the system
to agricultural and forestry uses which are exempt from critical area
regulations, and the slow pace of development changes in the area.232
Undoubtedly, however, the political controversy and the legal chal-
lenges generated by the Florida Keys designation were prominent
factors in the Division's decision.2 33
In lieu of an official designation, the Division proposed a joint state
and local voluntary resource management program. 234 To coordi-
nate the program, the Apalachicola Committee, consisting of repre-
sentatives of state and regional agencies and each of the constituent
counties, was created. Thus far, the program has concentrated pri-
marily on assisting local governments in preparing comprehensive
plans and development regulations and studying the economic devel-
opment potential of the area.235
As an unofficial, voluntary land management project, the Apalach-
icola plan is not subject to Florida's statutory critical areas regulatory
procedures. Therefore, its success depends entirely upon the willing-
ness of local officials to cooperate with state and regional agencies in
solving the area's problems. The threat of an official designation for
the area, an option that theoretically is still available to the state, may
prompt local governments to supply the cooperation necessary to the
success of the plan. Although the Division is already promoting the
plan as a legitimate and successful "working alternative" to official
230. Fox, Florida's Areas of Criical State Concern: An Update, 5 FLA. ENVT'L &
URB. IssuEs 6, 9 (April 1978).
231. THE APALACHICOLA RIVER REPORT, supra note 227, at 2.
232. Id at 33-44.
233. The critical areas section leader in the Division of State Planning acknowl-
edges that these were important considerations in the Division's decision not to rec-
ommend official designation. Interview with Stephen Fox, supra note 80.
234. THE APALACHICOLA RIVER REPORT, supra note 277, at 33-88.
235. Fox, supra note 230, at 9-10.
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designation,236 it is much too early to evaluate the success of this ap-
proach. If the plan achieves even modest successes, it will demon-
strate effectively how the mere existence of state critical area controls
can induce local governments to act voluntarily to protect state and
regional interests without the necessity for official implementation of
such controls.
IV. THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE AS A BARRIER TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FLORIDA CRITICAL AREAS
TECHNIQUE: ASKEW V. CROSS KEY
WATERWAYS
The critical areas technique touches sensitive nerves in the tradi-
tional American system of local land use legislation. It singles out
privately owned land within a designated area for regulatory treat-
ment generally more stringent and extensive than that previously ac-
corded such land and that currently given to land outside the critical
area. Additionally, the technique, which generally transfers land reg-
ulatory powers from local to regional and state entities, invades an
area that customarily has been considered the province of local gov-
ernment. Hence, allegations by affected private landowners and mu-
nicipalities of discriminatory, unreasonable land use regulation, and
state usurpation of local power are inevitable.
Despite their inevitability, such attacks, whether aimed at legisla-
tively or administratively designated critical areas, seem doomed to
failure. Numerous court challenges to legislative designations based
on due process, equal protection and home rule provisions have met
with little, if any, success.23 7 Similarly, in the first and only court
decision involving the state constitutionality of an administratively
designated critical area, these three lines of attack proved to be un-
236. Id at 10.
237 Due Process: See, e.g., Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 112
N.J. Super. 89, 128-130, 270 A.2d 418, 439-40 (1970), a7d, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545
(1973), appealdismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973) (holding that the Hackensack Meadowl-
ands Reclamation and Development Act did not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution because its "substantive provi-
sions are clearly related to the legislative ends sought to be achieved"); Horizon
Adirondack Corp. v. State, 88 Misc. 2d 619, 622-24, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237, 238-39
(1976) (holding that the comprehensive system of land use controls imposed by the
Adirondack Park Agency Act do not constitute a taking of private property for which
compensation must be paid). Put see Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Plan. Agency, 558
F.2d 928, 934, 937-38 (1977) (holding in part that private landowners' allegations that
the Tahoe comprehensive regional land use ordinance deprived them of all beneficial
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successful. 238 Thus, under the developing case law, due process,
equal protection and home rule considerations should pose no threat
to critical area designations.
The non-delegation doctrine is an entirely different matter. Based
upon constitutional separation of power provisions, this dotrine pro-
hibits delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency
unattended by sufficient standards for guiding administrative exercise
of the delegated power.239 The administrative approach to critical
area designation is a prime candidate for application of the non-dele-
gation doctrine. Unlike the legislative approach, which entails
designation of critical areas by the state legislature, the administra-
tive technique involves delegation of the legislative designation
power to an administrative agency. Askew v. Cross Key Water-
ways,240 the first state supreme court decision to consider the consti-
tutionality of this technique, suggests that the non-delegation
doctrine is a formidable barrier to implementation of critical-areas
legislation based on the Model Code, which relies on administrative
designation.
Cross Key Waterways arose from the designation of the Florida
Keys as an area of critical state concern. Various parties (petitioners)
to the administrative rule-making proceeding, including the City of
use of their property stated a cause of action under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution).
Equal Protection: See, e.g., Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. State, 112
Super. at 128, 270 A.2d at 439 (holding that the Hackensack Meadowlands Act does
not violate the federal equal protection clause because the meadowlands are suffi-
ciently different from the rest of the state to justify their special regulatory treatment);
Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (holding in part that statute creating Subsidence District with re-
gional regulatory powers did not violate the Texas equal protection clause because the
state legislature has "wide discretion in determining whether laws shall operate state-
wide or only in certain counties.").
Home Rule: See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 498, 362
N.E.2d 581, 582-83 (1977), 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (holding that the Adirondack Park
Agency Act does not violate New York's constitutional home rule provisions because
the park is a matter of state concern); People ex rel Younger v. County of El Dorado,
96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 560-61, 487 P.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (1971) (holding that the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact does not violate California's constitutional home rule
provisions because Lake Tahoe "is of regional, rather than local, concern").
238. See notes 241-42 and accompanying text infra.
239. For discussions of the non-delegation doctrine, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIvE LAW TREATISE § 2.00 to .17 (1970 Supp.); I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 31-91 (1965).
240. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
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Key West and numerous Florida Keys residents and property own-
ers, sought judicial review of the designation rule via a petition rais-
ing numerous constitutional and statutory objections."z ' After
resolving all other issues against the petitioners, 4 z the lower court
held that certain designation provisions of the Environmental Land
Act constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power and,
therefore, the Florida Keys designation rule must be quashed. More
specifically, the lower court declared two of the statutory critical area
categories unconstitutional because they did not contain any stan-
dards for evaluating and selecting the various resource areas subject
to designation and for identifying local governments that have not
protected state and regional interests in such areas.2 43 Subsequently,
the Administration Commission appealed the lower court's decisions
in both Cross Keys Waterways and Postal Colony Co. to the Florida
Supreme Court which, after consolidating the cases for review, af-
firmed. 2 4
The fulcrum for the supreme court's decision, which expressly re-
241, Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1063-65, 1070-71 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
242 Id at 1063. Observing that the Environmental Land Act contains numerous
provisions limiting regulation of private property, the lower court rejected arguments
that the Act's critical area provisions unconstitutionally violate private rights. Among
the statutory provisions cited by the court were the preservation of all existing private
property rights in accordance with the Florida and federal constitutions, FLA. STAT.
§ 380.021 (1977). the protection of vested rights, Id § 380.05 (15), the prohibition of
any state-imposed moratorium on development in critical areas, Id § 380.05(l)(b),
and the prolubition of any rule or order that is "unduly restrictive or constitutes a
taking of property without the payment of full compensation," Id § 380.08(l). Given
these statutory restrictions, the court had little difficulty in concluding that the Envi-
ronmental Land Act "does not unconstitutionally take private property without com-
pensation, deprive persons of property without due process of law, or abridge the
basic right to acquire, possess and protect property." 351 So. 2d at 1065.
The lower court also summarily dismissed contentions that the Environmental
Land Act's critical areas process violates Florida's constitutional home rule provi-
sions. While acknowledging the traditional "primacy of local government jurisdic-
tion in land development regulation," the court stated that Florida counties and
municipalities "have no constitutionally vested jurisdiction" over this matter. Rather,
"[t]he power exercised or withheld by those governments is the state's power, appro-
priately delegated." Id at 1065. In addition, the court noted that under the Florida
constitution, the powers of Florida counties and municipalities are subject to modifi-
cation by law. Id
243. Id at 1063, 1069-70.
244. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 914, 918 (Fla. 1978); Postal
Colony Co. is discussed in the text accompanying notes 203-208 supra.
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frained from passing upon any of the other issues presented,2 45 was
the non-delegation doctrine. The Florida non-delegation doctrine
derives from the state constitutional admonition that "[n]o person be-
longing to one branch [of government] shall exercise any power ap-
pertaining to either of the other branches. 2 46 In prior decisions
construing this separation of powers provision, the Florida Supreme
Court had enunciated several controlling principles for determining
whether a delegation of legislative power is violative of the constitu-
tional prohibition. Essentially, "[t]he legislature may not delegate the
power to enact a law, or to declare what the law shall be, or to exer-
cise an unrestricted discretion applying a law." '247 If the statutory
delegation of legislative power is stated in excessively vague or broad
terms, without statutory standards or guidelines sufficient to enable a
court or administrative agency to determine with certainty the mean-
ing of the terms, what constitutes a violation of the law, or the bound-
aries of an agency's power to promulgate rules for implementing the
statutory grant of power, the statute violates the non-delegation doc-
trine.248 The requisite specificity of the statutory standards, however,
varies with the subject matter of the legislation and the degree of
difficulty involved in drafting detailed standards.
249
In Cross Key Waterways the central issue was whether the relevant
designation provisions of the Environmental Land Act complied with
245. 372 So. 2d at 918. The lower court had resolved all other issues against the
petitioners. See note 242 and accompanying text supra. Among the points appealed
to, but not decided by, the supreme court were whether the statutory critical area
provisions and the two designation rules constituted a taking of private property with-
out due process of law or just compensation, whether the designations discriminated
against the affected landowners in violation of the state equal protection clause, and
whether the statute and rules unlawfully encroached upon the constitutional home
rule powers of local governments. See 372 So. 2d at 918. Brief of Appellant Florida
Administration Commission, at 11-12.
246. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides: "Branches ofgovernment.-The powers of
the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of
the other branches unless expressly provided herein."
247. State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 636-37, 47 So. 969, 976
(1908).
248. See Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1958); Sarasota
County v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
249. See State Dept. of Citrus v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 580-81 (Fla. 1970), in
which the court stated that the tests for determining the validity of a delegation of
legislative authority "must be tempered by due consideration for the practical context
of the problem sought to be remedied, or the policy sought to be effected." Id
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these principles. Designation of the Florida Keys was based on only
two of the Act's three critical areas criteria: areas "containing, or
having a significant impact" on various resources of state or regional
importance and areas "significantly affected by, or having a signifi-
cant effect" on major public facilities or other major public invest-
ment areas. 2'0 The presence of the terms critical state concern,
jignificant impact, and significant effect and the absence of guidelines
for agency selection, within the five-percent limitation, from among
the numerous areas and resources eligible for designation were obvi-
ous reference points for the lower court's application of the non-dele-
gation doctrine. In urging the supreme court to reverse the lower
court's decision, the Administration Commission contended that (1)
the statutory provisions satisfied the principles enunciated in prior
Florida Supreme Court decisions and that (2) in any event Florida
should abandon the traditional nondelegation doctrine in favor of the
more modem approach which emphasizes administrative standards
and safeguards rather than statutory standards. 1
The supreme court concurred in the lower court's opinion that the
statutory standards in question were deficient under the traditional
non-delegation doctrine as formulated and applied by the court in its
prior decisions. Applying the controlling principles of that doctrine
to the statutory provisions, the court concluded that the two critical
area criteria were "constitutionally defective because they reposit in
the Administration Commission the fundamental legislative task of
determining which geographic areas and resources are in greatest
need of protection." '252 Since this delegation of authority was unat-
tended by any statutory guidelines, a reviewing court could not deter-
mine whether the Commission's critical area designations comported
with the legislature's intent. Hence, the Commission became "the
lawgiver rather than the administrator of the law" in violation of the
non-delegation doctrine.253
250. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 914 (Feb. 1978). For the
full text of the two critical areas criteria, which appear at FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2)(a)-
(b) (1977), see text accompanying note 70 supra.
251, 372 So. 2d at 918.
252. Id at 919.
253. id The court described the relationship between the non-delegation doctrine
and judicial review as follows:
A corollary of the doctrine of unlawful delegation is the availability of judicial
review. In the final analysis it is the courts, upon a challenge to the exercise or
nonexercise of administrative action, which must determine whether the admin-
istrative agency has performed consistently with the mandate of the legislature.
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Following the lead of the lower court, the supreme court did not
find the Environmental Land Act deficient because of its use of the
vague and undefined terms, "critical area," "significant effect," and
"significant impact," despite the existence of ample precedent for
such a holding. In Sarasota County v. Barg,254 the Florida Supreme
Court in 1974 considered the constitutionality of a legislative act 2
55
creating a special conservation district. The statute prohibited,
within the district boundaries, "undue or unreasonable dredging,
filling or disturbance of submerged bottoms" and "unreasonable de-
struction of natural vegetation . . . in a manner which would be
harmful or slgnofcantly contribute to air and water pollution. 256
Observing that the Act did not define the descriptive terms or other-
wise provide any guidelines to assist any court or agency in constru-
ing them, the Supreme Court held that these statutory provisions
violated the non-delegation doctrine.257
While acknowledging the obvious similarity between the terms in
issue and those condemned in Barg, the supreme court in Cross Key
Waterways concluded that the use of such terms did not render the
critical areas designation criteria unconstitutional. The court recog-
nized that such "'approximations of the threshhold of legislative con-
cern' are. . . a practical necessity in legislation. '258 But even more
important, according to the court, such terms are now susceptible to
administrative refinement through adoption of agency rules pursuant
to the 1974 Florida APA which became effective after Barg was de-
cided.259
The fatal flaw was the Act's failure to provide any guidelines for
evaluating and choosing among the various resources subject to
When legislation is so lacking in guidelines that neither the agency nor the courts
can determine whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the legislature in
its conduct, then, in fact, the agency becomes the lawgiver rather than the admin-
istrator of the law.
Id
254. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
255. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-904.
256. Id §§ 6, 7. See also 302 So. 2d at 739.
257. 302 So. 2d at 742.
258. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 919 (Fla. 1978).
259. Id The lower court reached the same conclusion. See 351 So. 2d at 1069.
For purposes of the Florida APA rulemaking procedures, see notes 37-94 and accom-
panying text supra, "friule" is defined as "each agency statement of general applica-
bility that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 120.52(14) (West Supp. 1974-78).
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designation. This omission contrasted sharply with "the specificity of
the Big Cypress designation," the Act's restriction of "area of major
development potential" designations to those indicated in a legisla-
tively approved state land development plan, and the Act's provision
for adoption of administrative guidelines and standards as a prereq-
uisite to regulation of DRI."6° Since similar standards were not in-
cluded for the two critical area categories under consideration, the
court, in an extensive quote from the lower court's opinion, con-
cluded that "[t]he Act treats alike, as fungible goods, disparate cate-
gories of environmental, historical, natural and archeological
resources of regional or statewide importance and all of Florida's
manifold resources within those vast categories." '' Hence, under
the court's analysis, selection from among these resources is left to the
unbridled discretion of the Administration Commission in violation
of the non-delegation doctrine.262
Curiously, the court did not expressly address the lower court's
condemnation of the Act's failure to provide sufficient standards for
identifying "local governments whose stewardship of valued re-
sources is to be deemed inadequate to protect state and regional in-
terests.- 263 As construed by the lower court, the Act makes the
unresponsiveness of local governments to broader areal interests an
important consideration in critical area designations.2 64 Thus, dele-
gation of the designation power must be accompanied by statutory
standards for assessing the responsiveness of local governments.
260. 372 So. 2d at 919. FLA. STAT. 380.06(2)(a) (1977) provides, in part, that the
Division of State Planning "shall recommend to the Administration Commission"
and the "Commission shall adopt guidelines and standards to be used in determining
whether particular developments shall be presumed to be of regional impact." The
original guidelines and standards and any modifications thereto are subject to legisla-
tive review and approval. Id § 380.06(2)(a) .10(2).
261. Id The result, according to the court, is that up to the 5% limit:
the Commission is empowered to supercede as it chooses the local governments
regulating development in historic Pensacola or St. Augustine, or at the shores of
the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico to a depth of a thousand feet, or in all acreage
on the Suwanee and St. Johns and their tributaries, or indeed, in all the Florida
Keys If Cedar Key, Ybor City, Palm Beach and the path of the King's Road are
found to be historic resources of satisfactory importance, they too may be desig-
nated
Id
262. Id at 919-20.
263. Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1069-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
264. Id at 1070.
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While recognizing that the specificity of statutory standards may
properly vary directly with the complexity of the subject matter, the
lower court observed that nothing in the text or legislative history of
the Act evidenced a determination that formulation of more precise
standards for assessing local responsiveness is beyond the legisla-
ture's competence. Consequently, the lower court held that this omis-
sion violated the non-delegation doctrine.2 65
Two reasons for the Supreme Court's failure to deal with this issue
seem readily apparent. First, the lower court's emphasis on the iden-
tification of unresponsive local governments was misguided. No pro-
vision of the Act makes the unresponsiveness of local governments "a
substantial factor in the designation of critical areas" as the lower
court contended.266 While the perceived inability or unwillingness of
local governments to regulate land use in a manner calculated to pro-
tect state and regional interests may have motivated enactment of the
Environmental Land Act, designation of critical areas under the act
is not predicated upon such a showing. The responsiveness of local
governments does not become a factor in the critical areas process
until the regulatory phase is instituted following a critical area
designation. Although the statutory procedure for determining
whether local development regulations are adequate to protect state
and regional interests may give rise to another delegation problem,2 67
it is unrelated to and independent of the designation process. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more important, the court may have deemed it un-
necessary to address this issue in view of its ultimate ruling that the
Florida legislature, in some manner, must designate critical areas.268
Having concluded that the statutory provisions violated the tradi-
tional non-delegation doctrine, the court confronted the Administra-
tion Commission's contention that Florida should join those
jurisdictions requiring administrative standards and safeguards in-
stead of statutory standards. As the court acknowledged, the tradi-
tional doctrine, which is practically moribund at the federal level and
in a minority of states, 69 has been harshly criticized. Professor Ken-
265. Id
266. Id The lower court cited no provision of the Environmental Land Act in
support of its construction of the statute.
267. See text accompanying notes 293-94 infra.
268. See text accompanying notes 282-83 infra.
269. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 922-23 (Fla. 1978). See K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 2.00 to 2.04 (1976 ed.) for a dis-
cussion of the current status of the non-delegation doctrine in federal and state courts.
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neth Culp Davis, the grim reaper of the non-delegation doctrine,
sternly preaches that the doctrine "had to fail, should have failed,
and did fail" because the complexity of contemporary society re-
quires the delegation of broad grants of legislative power to adminis-
trative agencies unattended by meaningful statutory standards.27 °
For the traditional requirement of statutory standards, Professor Da-
vis would substitute a requirement of administrative standards and
safeguards which can be used by the judiciary to compel administra-
tors "to do what they reasonably can do to develop and to make
known the needed confinements of their discretionary power through
not only standards but also principles and rules."27' In other words,
administrative agencies should be required to fill in legislative "blank
checks" with administrative standards promulgated in accordance
with statutorily prescribed rule-making procedures.
Adoption of Professor Davis' revised non-delegation doctrine
would not have produced a total victory for the Administration Com-
mission. While application of the revised doctrine might have saved
the statutory critical area provisions, it would not have salvaged the
Florida Keys and Green Swamp designations. Neither the Adminis-
tration Commission nor the Division of State Planning refined the
statutory critical area standards by adopting policy statements as
rules under the Florida APA prior to designation of the two areas.
Hence, while the agencies, in designating the two areas, may have
structured "their discretionary power through appropriate safe-
guards" afforded by the APA rule-making procedures, they did not
"confine and guide their discretionary power through standards,
principles and rules" promulgated prior to their contested actions.2 72
This omission would have resulted in invalidation of the two designa-
tion rules even under the Davis approach.273
270. K. DAVIS, supra note 239, §§ 2.00-3.00.
271. Id §§ 2.00-5.00.
272 Among the changes proposed by Professor Davis to make the non-delegation
doctrine effective is "a judicially-enforced requirement that administrators must do
what they reasonably can do to develop and make known the needed confinements of
their discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules as well as to struc-
ture their power through procedural safeguards." K. DAVIS, supra note 239, §§ 2.00-
6.00.
273 For a case involving a state administrative agency's failure to refine inade-
quate statutory cnteria by promulgating administrative standards, see Texas Antiqui-
ties v. Dallas County Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1977). The
Texas Antiquities Code, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6145-9, §§ 1-22 (Vernon
1970). provided for a state Antiquities Committee and authorized it to designate State
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An amicus curiae urged the court to uphold the statutory provi-
sions and the two critical area designations by treating the Division's
report and recommendations for each of the two areas as subsidiary
administrative standards. 4 Under this approach, if the court, in re-
viewing both the statutory standards and the subsidiary administra-
tive standards, could have determined that the disputed agency
action promoted an ascertainable legislative policy, the two designa-
tions would have been upheld. Reliance on subsidiary administrative
standards, for which there is sparse precedent in federal law and even
less in Florida law,275 has all of the characteristics of a "boot strap"
Archeological Landmarks, defined in part as "[all. .. buildings ... and locations
of historical. . . interest." Id § 6. The Antiquities Committee did not adopt any
rules or standards stating criteria for buildings of historical interest prior to designat-
ing such a structure. 554 S.W.2d at 927. In an action challenging the constitutionality
of the statute, the Texas Supreme Court held that the historical buildings provision
violated the traditional non-delegation doctrine. Id at 927-28. To the state agency's
argument that the court should adopt Professor Davis' approach, the court responded:
Professor Davis concludes that the nondelegation doctrine in federal courts has
been less than successful, but he would not abolish all standards. . . .Instead he
would substitute administrative standards in the form of published rules and reg-
ulations for statutory standards. . . .We have, in this case, no standard or crite-
ria either by statute or rule which affords safeguards for the affected parties.
Id at 928.
274. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1978), Brief of Amicus
Curiae Governor Reuben O'D Askew, at 22-23.
275. One of the few federal cases which discusses the concept of subsidiary ad-
ministrative standards is Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Con-
nally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). In upholding the constitutionality of§ 202 of
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904, the court rejected the ap-
pellant's non-delegation attack as follows:
Another feature that blunts the 'blank check' rhetoric is the requirement that
any action taken by the Executive under the law, subsequent to the freeze, must
be in accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive. This
requirement, inherent in the Rule of Law and implicit in the Act, means that
however broad the discretion of the Executive at the outset, the standards once
developed limit the latitude of subsequent executive action ...
The requirement of subsidiary administrative policy, enabling Congress, the
courts and the public to assess the Executive's adherence to the ultimate legisla-
tive standard, is in furtherance of the purpose of the constitutional objective of
accountability. This 1970 Act gives broadest latitude to the Executive. Certainly
there is no requirement of formal findings. But there is an on-going requirement
of intelligible administrative policy that is corollary to and implementing of the
legislature's ultimate standard and objective. This requirement is underscored
by the consideration that the exercise of wide discretion will probably call for
"imaginative interpretation, leaving the courts to see whether the executive, using
its experience, 'has fairly exercised its discretion within the vaguish, penumbral
bounds' of the broad statutory standard.
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argument. It permits agency action that does not comply with the
requirement of prior administrative standards to satisfy the require-
ment. Nevertheless, given the difficulty of formulating administra-
tive standards for designating critical areas prior to experimentation
with the technique, this approach, however illogical, may be a realis-
tic one.
Judicial consideration of the issue of administrative standards was
unnecessary since the court rejected Professor Davis' revised non-del-
egation doctrine. While recognizing that the Davis approach has
merit, the court concluded that its adoption in Florida is precluded
by the state constitutional separation of powers provision.276 Unlike
the federal and some state constitutions, which vest legislative au-
thority in the legislative branch without prohibiting its delegation to
another branch,277 the Florida Constitution expressly forbids exercise
id at 758-59 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
In Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1978), an amicus curiae
cited McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) for the proposition that Florida has adopted the concept of subsidiary
administrative standards. Id Brief of Amicus Curiae Rueben O'D Askew, at 22-23.
However. while McDonald holds that inciient agency policy which is not a/general
applkabditv may be established through the adjudication of individual cases rather
than through the APA rulemaking process, 346 So. 2d at 581, this holding does not
seem broad enough to permit the establishment of critical areas criteria of general
statewide applicability through the designation of specific critical areas under the
rulemaking process.
276. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d at 924. For the full text of the
Florida constitutional provision, see note 246 supra.
277. U.S. CoNrsT. art. 1, § I provides, in relevant part, that "all legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."
An example of a similar state constitutional provision is Wash. Const. art. 2, § 1
which states: "[t]he legislative authority of the State of Washington shall be vested in
the legislature." The Washington Supreme Court, a leading state exponent of Profes-
sor Davis' revised nondelegation doctrine, has interpreted this provision as follows:
[Tihese provisions of the Washington State and United States constitutions mean
only that legislative power is delegated initially and fundamentally to the legisla-
tive bodies. We believe that one of the legislative powers granted by these provi-
sions is the power to determine the amount of discretion an administrative
agency should exercise in carrying out the duties granted to it by the legislature.
To construe these provisions as confining the exercise of legislative power to the
legislative bodies, would be to read them as limitations of power rather than as
grants of power. We may assume that if the framers had intended to so limit the
power of the legislative bodies, they would have done so expressly, rather than by
implication.
Barry & Barry, Inc. v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 500 P.2d 540, 544 (Wash. 1972).
In Crass Key Waterways, the Florida Supreme Court noted that, unlike the United
States and Washington constitutions, Article II, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution,
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of the legislative power by a member of another branch of govern-
ment. Thus, according to the court, until the constitutional provision
is amended, the traditional non-delegation doctrine will prevail in
Florida."'
The question remains whether the Environmental Land Act can be
amended to provide sufficient statutory standards for administrative
designation of critical areas. Logically, if the non-delegation doctrine
is the sole basis of the judicial invalidation of the statutory designa-
tion provisions, the legislature should be able to cure the statutory
deficiency by supplying adequate administrative designation guide-
lines. Clearly, the lower court's opinion did not foreclose the possi-
bility of curative legislation." 9 Similarly, much of the Florida
Supreme Court's opinion suggests that administrative designation is
contingent only upon sufficient statutory criteria. Indeed, the high
court's extended analysis of both the traditional and revised non-del-
egation doctrines is rendered irrelevant if provision of adequate stat-
utory standards for administrative designation is deemed a legal
impossibility.280
"does by its second sentence contain an express limitation upon the exercise by a
member of one branch of any powers appertaining to either of the other branches of
government." 372 So. 2d at 924.
278. 372 So. 2d at 925.
279. Unlike the Florida Supreme Court, which ruled that critical area designa-
tions must be made by the state legislature, see notes 281-83 and accompanying text
infra, the lower court held only that the challenged statutory provisions lacked ade-
quate statutory standards and therefore violated the Florida Constitution. 351 So. 2d
at 1062. The following passage from the lower court's opinion is one of several indi-
cating that the court considered development of adequate standards to be within the
legislature's competence:
We are mindful that the required particularity of statutory limitations on admin-
istrative discretion may be greater or less, depending on the subject and the diffi-
culty of the task. . . . We have scoured the text and legislative history of
Chapter 380 [Environmental Land Act] for evidence that the legislature consid-
ered formulation of standards for the political judgments required by Section
380.05 [critical areas section] to be beyond its competence. Our search was in
vain.
Id at 1070 (citations omitted).
280. During its discussion and application of the traditional nondelegation doc-
trine, the supreme court stated: "The deficiency in the legislation here considered is
the absence of legislative delineation of priorities among competing areas and re-
sources which require protection in the State interest." 372 So. 2d at 919. The clear
implication is that if the legislature had delineated such priorities, the Administration
Commission could have chosen from among them. Such statements are inconsistent
with the Court's ultimate ruling that the legislature itself must designate critical areas.
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Nevertheless, the court held that critical area designations in Flor-
ida must be accomplished legislatively. According to the court, to
fulfill its constitutional mandate to conserve and protect the state's
natural resources and scenic beauty28" '
the legislature need only exercise its constitutionalperrogative and
duty to identify and designate those resources and facilities. It
may be done in advance as with the Big Cypress area of critical
state concern,. . . or through ratification of administratively de-
veloped recommendations as in the case of the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Plan. . . .In either case the ulti-
mate selection of priorities for areas of critical state or regional
concern will rest with representatives of our government charged
with such responsibilities under our Constitution.282
In a brief opinion denying the Administration Commission's petition
for rehearing, the court, while stating that the Big Cypress and Cali-
fornia Coastal Zone Commission approaches are not exclusive reme-
dies for the constitutional defects, did not recede from its holding that
the legislature has a constitutional duty to identify and designate crit-
ical areas.28 3 Thus, the clear import of the quoted language is that
281. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 states: "Natural Resources and scenic beauty.-It
shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic
beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water
pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise."
282. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978) (citations
omitted).
283. Id at 926.
In denying the Administration Commission's Petition for Rehearing or Clarifica-
tion, the court stated:
Appellants maintain that the quoted language [see text accompanying note 282
supra] can be construed to limit the legislature to the two alternatives suggested
in its attempt to devise legislation to protect and conserve our natural resources
while not violating the separation of powers doctrine.
Because of the significance of this issue, we deem it appropriate, in this in-
stance, to disavow the construction attributed by appellants to the above-quoted
language. The examples outlined in the opinion present obvious remedies for the
deficiencies found in section 380.05; however, it was not our purpose to indicate
that the alternatives stated are exclusive.
Id
Proponents of a pure administrative designation mechanism seized upon this lan-
guage to support their contention that Cross Key Waterways does not preclude ad-
ministrative designation without some form of legislative approval. See, e.g., Stroud,
Areas of Critical State Concern - Legislative Options Following the Cross Key Decision,
6 FLA. ENV'T & URB. ISSUEs 4, 6 (April 1979). This argument ignores several impor-
tant considerations. First, the court denied the Commission's petition which re-
quested the court to clarify the Cross Key Waterways opinion so as to permit "further
legislative efforts to delegate to the Administration Commission authority to desig-
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the legislative power to designate cannot be delegated uncondition-
ally to an administrative agency regardless of the specificity of the
statutory standards. Since Cross Key Waterways is a case of first im-
pression, both in Florida and nationally, the court cited no authority
for its holding. It observed, however, that its review of other critical
areas legislation, including the Martha's Vineyard Act which is also
based on the Model Code, disclosed no instance of an unconditional
delegation of the designation power to an administrative agency.
284
The internal logic and consistency of the court's opinion is serious-
ly flawed. Rejection of the revised non-delegation doctrine did not
prevent the court from approving delegations of legislative power at-
tended by such vague standards as "significant impact" and "signifi-
cant effect." Recall that, according to the court, such statutory
standards are subject to clarification and refinement by adoption of
administrative standards, 285 a pronouncement which, parenthetically,
bears a striking resemblance to the revised non-delegation doctrine
rejected by the court. As the lower court observed, the delegation of
the designation power was not entirely devoid of statutory standards
because the Environmental Land Act required each of the Division's
critical area recommendations to include "the reasons why the partic-
ular area proposed is of critical concern," the advantages of designa-
tion, the dangers of uncoordinated development, and guiding
development principles for the area.2 6 If terms such as "significant
nate critical areas." See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
Petition for Rehearing or Clarification, 2-3. Second, the court did not disavow its
original ruling that the legislature has a "constitutional duty" to designate critical
areas, see text accompanying note 282 supra, and that designation of critical areas is a
"fundamental and primary policy decision" that can only be made by the legislature,
see text accompanying note 292 infra. Third, as the introductory portion of this Arti-
cle illustrates, there are numerous approaches by which the legislature may designate
critical areas either in advance or by ratification of administrative proposals. See text
accompanying notes 9-59 supra for a description of some of these approaches. The
Big Cypress and California coastal zone approaches mentioned by the court are only
two examples of the many ways in which the legislature itself may confer critical area
status on particular areas. In view of the first two considerations, all the court has
done in its brief opinion on rehearing is to reject the notion that these two examples
are the only constitutional means by which the Florida legislature may designate criti-
cal areas.
284. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 920, 923 (Fla. 1978). The
court also noted that other state cases upholding delegations of regulatory power over
critical areas to administrative agencies involved legislatively designated areas. Id at
920-22.
285. See text accompanying notes 254-59 supra.
286. 351 So. 2d at 1066.
[Vol, 18:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol18/iss1/2
REGULATING AREAS OF CONCERN
impact" and "significant effect" can be sufficiently clarified and re-
fined through the administrative rule-making process, then certainly
these more detailed provisions are also susceptible to similar refine-
ment.
287
What is the explanation for the seeming inconsistency in the
court's application of the non-delegation doctrine? The answer lies
in the nature of the case. Cross Key Waterways is no ordinary dele-
gation case. It involves not only a delegation of the legislative power
to regulate land use to an administrative agency but also a realloca-
tion of that power between state and local governments. The delega-
tion issue presents a classic case for application of the nondelegation
doctrine's requirement of sufficient statutory standards. The reallo-
cation issue, on the other hand, involves fundamental social, political
and legal concerns which transcend the narrow separation of power
considerations underlying the non-delegation doctrine and which,
therefore, cannot be completely alleviated by the most detailed statu-
tory standards.
These concerns are manifest in the opinions of both reviewing
courts. Permeating the lower court's application of the conventional
non-delegation doctrine is a profound concern for the status of local
government and the appropriate means of altering its traditional role
in Florida's governmental structure. The lower court observed that
the Environmental Land Act, by shifting "ultimate regulatory au-
thority from the county courthouse and city hall to the capitol,"
touched "sensibilities as old as the Revolution itself." '288 Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that the Florida legislature is competent to
decide that all or some local governments have not adequately pro-
tected state or regional interests and that a legislative reallocation of
land use regulatory powers from local governments to the state is not
barred by Florida's constitutional home rule provisions.289 The fun-
damental error of the Environmental Land Act was its vesting of the
287. The lower court deemed the considerations set out in these provisions to be
inadequate statutory standards because their source is either the Administration
Commission itself or its subordinate agency, the Division of State Planning. Id at
1066. By contrast, the lower court considered "significant" to be a sufficient standard
because it can be administratively refined by the Commission or Division. Id at
1069. Since the Commission or Division is the source of the refinement, and, there-
fore, for all practical purposes, the sole determiner of what is significant, the distinc-
tion seems more imaginary than real.
288. 351 So. 2d at 1065.
289. Id at 1070.
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reallocation power in an administrative agency. "More precisely,"
according to the lower court, "the statute delegates to the Commis-
sion the power to say who in Florida the lawgiver shall be, whether
local government or the Commission itself, and it does so virtually
without statutory discipline. "-hat is at stake here is not the extent of
government regulation ofprivate property but the structure of Florida's
government."2 90 In the lower court's view, reordering of that struc-
ture cannot constitutionally be left to the discretion of the Adjudica-
tory Commission, however prudent that body may be in exercising its
power. Rather, "changing the seats of political power" from the local
to the state level "is a function of Florida's Constitution and laws, for
which 'the political sensitivity of the final administrative decision-
makers' is an unacceptable substitute."'291 These passages clearly in-
dicate that the lower court's primary concern was not delegation of
legislative regulatory power over land use to an administrative
agency but the distribution of that power between state and local
governments.
A similar concern is reflected in the Florida Supreme Court's opin-
ion. But unlike the lower court, which temporarily shed its non-dele-
gation garb to express concern about the political implications of an
administrative reallocation of power between state and local govern-
ment, the Supreme Court carefully cloaked its apprehension in the
terminology of the non-delegation doctrine. It characterized the
designation of a critical area as a "fundamental and primary policy
decision" which, therefore, cannot be delegated by the legislature.292
The court nowhere explains why the actual designation of a critical
area is a "fundamental and primary policy" decision. Nor did the
court explain why it did not select another more conventional deci-
sional avenue: the general legislative determination that there are
critical areas requiring special regulation is the primary policy deci-
sion which can be validly implemented by administrative designation
290. Id at 1068 (emphasis partly in original and partly supplied).
291. Id at 1070. Professor Gilbert Finnell, in his introductory essay on the Envi-
ronmental Land Act, contended:
the political sensitivity of the final administrative decisionmakers-the state's
highest elected executive officers, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as an Ad-
ministrative Commission-should assure that the increased state role in land de-
velopment regulation by means of the Critical Area technique will occur only
when there is a compelling state interest backed by a strong public consensus.
Finnell, supra note 15, at 122.
292. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924-25 (Fla. 1978).
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of particular areas pursuant to adequate statutory standards. The
reason for the court's rejection of the more obvious route is not diffi-
cult to perceive. While the road not taken was perfectly consistent
with the traditional nondelegation doctrine, it would have led to an
administrative reordering of state and local government. Thus, the
court opted for an application of the non-delegation doctrine which
ensures that reallocations of power between the state and local gov-
ernments will be made only by the legislature.293
Cross Ke' Waterways would have been the death knell of the regu-
latory and adjudicatory phases of Florida's original critical areas
process. In addition to delegating the designation power to the Ad-
ministration Commission, the original Environmental Land Act dele-
gated to the Commission the power to adopt "principles for guiding
the development" of critical areas and development regulations for
any local government that failed to submit local regulations deemed
by the Division of State Planning to be consistent with the guiding
principles. Prior to its amendment in 1979, the Environmental Land
Act contained no provision for legislative review of the guiding prin-
ciples. Thus, as the lower court in Cross Key Waterways mentioned
without discussion,294 these statutory provisions also raised a delega-
tion issue since the Act contained absolutely no standards governing
the Commission's adoption of guiding development principles to
which all local regulations must conform. Moreover, the guiding de-
velopment principles, which provide the only standards for state
agency review and adoption of development regulations, were not
constitutionally sufficient for this purpose since they were derived
solely from the Commission itself.295 For the same reason, the guid-
ing principles and implementing regulations, the only substantive cri-
293 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Arthur England of the Florida
Supreme Court stated that the non-delegation doctrine, as construed in the principal
opinion. -guarantees that Florida's government will continue to operate only by con-
sent of the governed." Id at 925.
294. The lower court stated that under the Environmental Land Act "the power to
select the sites of desirable regulation, as well as the power to regulate, is delegated to
the Commission. 351 So. 2d at 1066 (emphasis added).
295. The Administration Commission argued to the Florida Supreme Court that
the guiding development principles adopted simultaneously with a critical areas
designation would prevent administrative abuse of the process. In rejecting this argu-
ment. the court stated:
the standard by which land development regulations are to be measured is not a
standard articulated by the legislature but one determined by the Administration
Commission through formulation of principles for guiding development. In
short the primary policy decision of the area of critical state concern to be desig-
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teria for state review of local critical area development decisions,
were not sufficient standards for exercise of the Commission's adjudi-
catory power.2 96 Consequently, the original Environmental Land
Act's entire administrative structure for managing critical areas was
probably unconstitutional.
The damage inflicted by Cross Key Waterways is not irreparable.
Immediately following rendition of the decision, a special session of
the Florida legislative temporarily designated the Green Swamp and
the Florida Keys as critical areas and adopted the existing regulations
pending further consideration of the problem during the next regular
legislative session.2 97 Subsequently, in 1979 the Florida legislature
extended these two designations subject to repeal by the Administra-
tion Commission no later than July 1, 1982. Repeal of the designa-
tions, however, is contingent upon approval of the Division of State
Planning of land development regulations and comprehensive plans
adopted by the constituent local governments.2 98 As a result of the
nated as well as the principles for guiding development in that area are the sole
province of an administrative body. From that determination all else follows.
Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978).
296. Amicus Curiae Reuben O'D Askew, in urging the supreme court to uphold
the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Administration Commission, contended
that Florida courts have been much more permissive when reviewing legislative dele-
gations of rulemaking power than when reviewing delegations of adjudicatory au-
thority. Hence, the amicus argued that Sarasota County v. Barg, discussed in text
accompanying notes 253-258 supra, which involved a delegation of adjudicatory au-
thority, should not be dispositive of Cross Key Waterways which involved a delega-
tion of rulemaking power. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla.
1978), Brief of Amicus Curiae Governor Reuben O'D Askew, at 11-12, 18.
For a case in which the Florida Supreme Court held a delegation of adjudicatory
authority unconstitutional, see Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla.
1962). The statute in question authorized a state agency to impose restrictions on the
transfer of automobile transportation brokerage licenses "where the public interest
may be best served thereby." Id at 275. In declaring this delegation unconstitu-
tional, the court stated: "The Legislature cannot delegate to an administrative
agency, even one clothed with certain quasi-judicial powers, the unbridled discretion
to adjudicate private rights. It is essential that the act which delegates the power
likewise defines with reasonable certainty the standards which shall guide the agency
in the exercise of the power." Id at 275 (citations omitted).
For general discussions of delegation of adjudicatory power to administrative agen-
cies, see N. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 103-108 (6th ed. 1974); K.
DAVIS, supra note 235, § 2.10.
297. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-627, §§ 1-2.
298. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73, §§ 5-6. Neither the Green Swamp nor Florida
Keys designations can be repealed prior to July 1, 1980. Moreover, upon recommen-
dation by the Division of State Planning to the Administration Commission, the re-
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legislature's action, the Green Swamp and Florida Keys designations
have been insulated from further constitutional attacks based on the
non-delegation doctrine.
Unfortunately, the Florida legislature failed to remove the non-
delegation doctrine as a potential barrier to future critical area desig-
nations. The issue could have been eliminated by a simple statutory
amendment requiring some form of legislative designation or ratifica-
tion of critical areas. This approach not only would have satisfied
Cross Key Waterways but it would have been consistent with the
strong comprehensive legislation enacted in other states. For exam-
ple, the Oregon statute requires legislative approval of administrative
critical area recommendations, and the Minnesota act provides that
administrative designations shall expire within three years unless rat-
ified by the state legislature or the appropriate regional planning
council. 29 9 Nevertheless, under intense pressure from proponents of
a pure administrative designation mechanism, 3" the Florida legisla-
ture adopted an approach that leaves the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's critical areas legislation in serious doubt.
The Florida legislature's response to the non-delegation problem
in the context of future designations is largely cosmetic. It combines
more detailed statutory standards for identifying the types of re-
sources and public facilities that can be administratively designated
as critical areas with a weak form of legislative review. But while the
new statutory provisions do describe with somewhat greater specific-
ity the general areal categories from which critical areas may be des-
ignated, they are still so broad as to encompass almost any area of the
peal may be effective for only a particular local government's portion of the critical
areas. Id §§ 5(3), 6(4). However, the City of Key West must be removed from the
Florida Keys critical area immediately upon approval by the Division of State Plan-
ning of the land use element of the city's local comprehensive plan. Id § 6(3).
299. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.405(2)-(5) (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN.
116G.06(2)(c) (West 1977).
300 Governor Robert Graham, a member of the Environmental Land Manage-
ment Study Committee which proposed the Environmental Land Act, strongly sup-
ported amendatory legislation providing for continued administrative designation
without legislative ratification. See Minutes of Governor's Task Force on Resource
Management Meeting 3-4 (March 7, 1978). The Governor's Task Force recom-
mended to the 1979 Florida legislature that it amend the Environmental Land Act to
provide for more detailed statutory standards for administrative designation without
requiring legislative ratification. Id at 1, 6. Proponents of this approach then
mounted a campaign to convince the Florida legislature that the Cross Key Water-
ways decision did not foreclose administrative designation without legislative confir-
mation. See, e.g., Stroud, supra note 283.
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state,30 ' a possibility that was condemned in Cross Key Water-
ways.30 2 Moreover, the revised standards do not establish any priori-
301. See 979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73, § 4(2), in which the revised statutory standards
are set forth as follows:
An area of critical state concern may be designated only for:
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environmental
or natural resources of regional or statewide importance, including but not lim-
ited to state or federal parks, forests, wildlife refuges, wilderness areas, aquatic
preserves, major rivers and estuaries, state environmentally endangered lands,
Outstanding Florida Waters, and aquifer recharge areas, the uncontrolled pri-
vate or public development of which would cause substantial deterioration of
such resources. Specific criteria which shall be considered in designating an area
under this paragraph include:
1. Whether the economic value of the area, as determined by the type, vari-
ety, distribution, relative scarcity and condition of the environmental or natural
resources within the area, is of substantial regional or statewide importance.
2. Whether the ecological value of the area, as determined by the physical
and biological components of the environmental system, is of substantial re-
gional or statewide importance.
3. Whether the area is a designated critical habitat of any state or federally
designated threatened or endangered plant or animal species.
4. Whether the area is inherently susceptible to substantial development due
to its geographic location or natural aesthetics.
5. Whether any existing or planned substantial development within the area
will directly, significantly and deleteriously affect any or all of the environmental
or natural resources of the area which are of regional or statewide importance.
(b) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, historical or
archaeological resources, sites, or statutorily-defined historical or archaeological
districts, the private or public development of which would cause substantial de-
terioration or complete loss of such resources, sites or districts. Specific criteria
which shall be considered in designating an area under this paragraph include:
I. Whether the area is associated with events that have made a significant
contribution to the history of the state or region.
2. Whether the area is associated with the lives of persons who are significant
to the history of the state or region.
3. Whether the area contains any structure which embodies the distinctive
characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represents the
work of a master, or that possessed high artistic values, or that represents a sig-
nificant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual dis-
tinction and which are of regional or statewide importance.
4. Whether the area has yielded, or will likely yield information important to
the prehistory or history of the state or region.
(c) An area having a significant impact upon, or being significantly impacted
by, an existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public
investment including, but not limited to, highways, ports, airports, energy facili-
ties and water management projects.
Compare the new criteria with the old statutory standards which appear in the text
accompanying note 70 supra.
302. For the court's condemnation of the virtually unlimited geographical scope
of the original statutory standards, see note 260 and accompanying text supra.
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ties for choosing among the resources encompassed by the critical
area categories. Hence, as the Florida Supreme Court stated in inval-
idating the original categories, the new categories, standing alone,
"are constitutionally defective because they reposit in the Adminis-
tration Commission the fundamental legislative task of determining
which geographic areas and resources are in greatest need of protec-
tion."3 3
Are these deficiencies in the statutory standards ameliorated by the
provision for legislative review? In a tacit acknowledgment that
something more than detailed statutory standards are required to sat-
isfy the dictates of Cross Key Waterways, the new legislation provides
for legislative review but not ratification of administrative designa-
tions. As under the original Environmental Land Act, the Adminis-
tration Commission will continue by rule to designate, and adopt
guiding development principles for, each critical area.3" Although a
designation rule becomes effective twenty days after filing with the
Secretary of State, it must nevertheless be submitted to the presiding
officer of each legislative house for review at least thirty days prior to
the next regular legislative session.3" 5 While it "may reject, modify,
or take no action relative to the adopted rule," 3" the legislature is not
required to ratify the rule. Thus, unlike Florida's administrative DRI
guidelines, which become effective only if approved by the legisla-
ture,30 7administrative critical area designations, which cut much
more deeply into the fabric of the state's system of local government,
become effective without any legislative action.
This method of legislative oversight may not satisfy the require-
ments of Cross Key Waterways. Under this procedure the legislature
will not exercise its judicially declared "constitutional prerogative
and duty to identify and designate" critical areas. Rather, the Ad-
ministration Commission will continue to identify and designate such
areas. While some proposed designations may be rejected or modi-
fied by the legislature, others will become effective as the result of
legislative inaction rather than upon the affirmative legislative action
seemingly contemplated by Cross Key Waterways. Hence, since the
legislature will neither directly designate the critical area in advance
303 Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 919 (Fla. 1978).
304. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73, § 4.
305. Id
306. Id
307. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(10) (1979).
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nor indirectly designate the area through official ratification of ad-
ministrative proposals, the new statutory provision may be unconsti-
tutional.
Arguably, the legislature's failure to reject a designation rule con-
stitutes an implied ratification which should satisfy Cross Key Water-
ways. This argument has several weaknesses. First, it was not
sufficient to save the Green Swamp and Florida Keys designations.
Since the legislature has the inherent power to repeal any administra-
tive rule, either directly or indirectly, through repeal or modification
of the enabling legislation, it could have repealed the Green Swamp
and Florida Keys designation rules regardless of whether they were
submitted for legislative review by the Administration Commission.
Thus, according to the theory of implied ratification, the Florida leg-
islature's failure to repeal the rules during three consecutive legisla-
tive sessions signaled its approval of the two designations.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the two desig-
nations.
Second, under Florida's legislative review procedure, it is impossi-
ble to ascertain when legislative ratification occurs. Unlike most fed-
eral and other state legislative veto statutes, which generally provide
that administrative rules shall become effective only upon failure of
the legislature to veto them within a specified period of time,"'8 the
Florida statute establishes no deadline by which the legislature must
reject already effective designation rules. Thus, the legislature's fail-
ure to reject during the first legislature session following a rule's pro-
mulgation does not necessarily constitute an implied ratification since
the legislature may consider the matter in a following session.
Finally, and most importantly, the assumption that a failure to re-
ject constitutes legislative approval is itself a highly dubious one. It
ignores the realities of the legislative process. While a majority of the
members of either or both legislative houses may oppose a particular
308. See generally Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Reg-
ulatlion A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1977), which analyzes
some of the federal statutes, and F. COOPER, 1 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 221-30
(1965), which discusses the state acts.
Interestingly, an earlier version of 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73 embodied this ap-
proach by providing that designation rules proposed by the Administration Commis-
sion "shall be submitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
for review no later than 30 days prior to the next regular session of the Legislature.
Unless repealed or modified by the Legislature, the Commission rule shall become
effective 10 days following the close of the session." H.B. 1150 (Second Engrossed,
1979 Sess.).
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designation, they can be prevented by the committee system and a
variety of parliamentary maneuvers from ever registering their oppo-
sition. Implying legislative confirmation from a failure to veto be-
comes even more difficult if one legislative house votes to reject a
designation rule while the other makes no official action.3 °9 Given
the nature of the legislative process, there is ample reason for re-
jecting the theory of implied ratification.
Ultimately, the constitutional fate of the 1979 amendments de-
pends on whether the Florida Supreme Court has the courage of its
Cross Key Waterways convictions. If the court adheres to the princi-
ples enunciated in that decision, challenges to future designations are
likely to result in invalidation of the entire statutory scheme for man-
aging critical areas. On the other hand, if the court yields to the legis-
lative will and upholds the constitutionality of the new designation
procedure, the other delegation problems inherent in the regulatory
and adjudicatory phases of the original Florida critical areas process
will also be eliminated. The guiding development principles, which
provide the only standards for evaluating local development regula-
tions and decisions, are now subject to legislative review in the same
manner as proposed designations?3 'I Although as a matter of public
policy it still seems desirable to link critical area regulation and adju-
dication to the state comprehensive plan, the new legislative review
procedure, if it passes constitutional muster, will remove the non-del-
egation doctrine as a barrier to future implementation of the Florida
critical areas program.
309 For discussions of these and other limitations of the legislative veto approach
to controlling agency discretion, see Brust & Gellhom, supra note 308, at 1414-20;
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
1119 (1978); Watson, Congress Steps Out .4 Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975).
Ironically, the difficulty of successfully traversing the legislative process was consid-
ered the major drawback to requiring legislative ratification of administratively desig-
nated critical areas. The author was invited to participate with various Florida
officials in an informal discussion of the relative merits of various proposals to amend
the Environmental Land Act in Tallahassee, Florida on March 15, 1979. During the
course of the meeting, several participants expressed the opinion that legislative ratifi-
cation would make it impossible to designate critical areas because opponents of par-
ticular designations could prevent the proposal from getting out of committee for a
vote by the full membership of each legislative House. Author's Notes of March 15,
1979 meeting.
310. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73, § 4(1IXc). The guiding development principles are
not applicable to development in the critical area until legislative review of the
designation rule is completed. Id
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Although Cross Key Waterways is undoubtedly a major disap-
pointment to advocates of stronger state administrative controls over
land use, serious students of American land use law should not be
surprised by the decision which has a close historical parallel in the
annals of local zoning. In Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of
Lower Gwynedd Township,31 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1960 considered the validity of a municipal floating zone ordinance.
Basically, the ordinance created a new zoning district, F-1 Limited
Industrial, and established detailed requirements conditions and re-
strictive uses for an "F-1" classification. However, instead of de-
lineating the boundaries of specific "F-1" districts, the ordinance
created a procedure whereby any landowner could apply to the local
governing body for "F-l" zoning. After receiving the local plan com-
mission's report and holding a public hearing, the local governing
body was authorized to approve, approve with conditions, or deny
the application.312  The court invalidated the ordinance on the
ground that it was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Moreover, according to the court, the procedure for creating "F-I"
districts on a case-by-case basis without rigid statutory standards or a
finally formulated plan entailed several secondary evils, including
spot zoning and politically motivated decision-making. 313
Essentially, area of critical state concern, as envisioned by the
Model Code and implemented in Florida, is the floating zone tech-
nique writ large. To paraphrase one commentator's description of a
floating zone, a critical area floats above the state in anticipation of
311. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
312. Id. at 213-14, 164 A.2d at 8-9.
313. Id. at 217-18, 164 A.2d at 11. As to the necessity for a comprehensive plan,
the court stated:
The adoption of a procedure whereby it is decided which areas of land will even-
tually be zoned "F-I" Limited Industrial Districts on a case by case basis pa-
tently admits that at the point of enactment of ordinance 28 there was no orderly
plan of particular land use for the community. Final determination under such a
scheme would expressly await solicitation by individual landowners, thus mak-
ing the planned land use of the community dependent upon its development. In
other words, the development itself would become the plan, which is manifestly
the antithesis of zoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Id. at 217, 164 A.2d 11.
Local zoning law concepts have been utilized in other challenges to critical areas
legislation. See, e.g., Adirondack Park Agency v. Ton-Da-Lay Assoc., 61 A.D.2d 107,
109, 401 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905 (1978) (New York Supreme Court rejected a claim that
the legislation designating the Adirondack Park for special regulatory treatment con-
stituted unconstitutional spot zoning).
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being brought down to earth at the time and place desired by the
designating agency.314 Consequently, to the extent that critical areas
enabling legislation utilizing an administrative designation device
does not contain sufficient statutory standards or link the designation
power to a state comprehensive plan, the technique may encounter
the same judicial hostility which has greeted the floating zone in
some jurisdictions. Indeed, the lower court's criticism of the critical
areas technique in Cross Key Waterways is reminiscent of the Penn-
sylvania court's condemnation of the floating zone in Eves. Although
the Florida court did not expressly state that administrative critical
area designations must be made in accordance with a legislatively
approved state comprehensive plan, it strongly suggested that such a
plan is prerequisite to valid implementation of that technique.3"5
Hence, even in states where the nondelegation doctrine presents no
obstacles to administrative designation of critical areas, legislatures
should seriously consider a requirement that such designations be
made in accordance with a state comprehensive plan.31 6
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's experiment with critical area controls surpasses that of
314 See 16 CATH. L. REV. 85, 87 (1966) (the floating zone "figuratively floats
above the landscape in no fixed position, until it is brought down to earth by a bound-
ary-change rezoning amendment").
315 The lower court unfavorably compared the two critical area categories under
attack with the major development potential category which must be based on a state
comprehensive plan. 351 So. 2d at 1069. See FLA. STAT. §380.05(2)(c) (1977)
(quoted in the text accompanying note 70 supra). The court observed that the two
defective categories lack "'the predictability of a legislatively approved comprehensive
plan which confines" the major development potential category. Id In a footnote to
this passage, the court noted that while the Model Code does not make the adoption
of a state comprehensive plan a prerequisite to designation of critical areas, the ALI
proposal does recognize that selection of all critical areas within a state "would logi-
cally require a comprehensive study of the state's development patterns and natural
resources." Id at 1069 n.16. For the full text of the Model Code's discussion of the
relationship between critical area designations and comprehensive planning, see the
Reporters' Notes following Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-201.
316. The Model Code Reporters contend that requiring advance preparation of a
legislatively approved state comprehensive plan might prevent effective regulation of
areas of "immediate and critical importance." Model Code, supra note 26, § 7-201.
In Cross Ker Waterways the lower court in rejecting this argument, noted, with irrefu-
table logic, that "iff the immediacy or emergency nature of a critical state concern is
thought to require designation power independent of priorities in a state plan other-
wise required, standards for the exercise of emergency powers may be legislated."
351 So. 2d at 1069 n.16.
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any other state. Between 1972, when Florida became the first state to
adopt the Model Code's critical areas technique, and 1978, when the
Florida Supreme Court invalidated portions of the state enabling leg-
islation and two critical area designations, the state designated four
areas of critical state concern. One area, the Big Cypress, was desig-
nated by the Florida legislature, two areas, the Green Swamp and the
Florida Keys, were officially designated by the Administration Com-
mission, and one area, the Apalachicola River and Bay System, was
unofficially designated by the Division of State Planning. Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Cross Key Waterways, the statutorily
prescribed regulatory framework had been established in each of the
three officially designated areas and a voluntary management system
had been instituted in the unofficially proclaimed fourth area. Thus,
the Florida experience provides a basis for evaluating the compre-
hensive administrative technique for regulating critical areas as pro-
posed by the Model Code.
Closely tracking the Model Code, Florida's Environmental Land
Act, as originally enacted, provided for a critical areas process com-
prised of three distinct phases: designation, regulation and adjudica-
tion. A state administrative agency consisting of the Florida
governor and six popularly-elected cabinet members was assigned
primary responsibility for implementing each of the three phases.
Sitting as the Florida Administration Commission, these state offi-
cials were empowered to designate, and establish guiding develop-
ment principles for, critical areas selected in accordance with broad
statutory criteria. Following the official designation of a critical area,
the Administration Commission was authorized to impose upon a
constituent local government land development regulations prepared
by its subordinate agency, the Division of State Planning, unless the
local government prepared regulations deemed by the Division to be
in compliance with the guiding principles. Finally, these same state
officials, in their collective capacity as the Florida Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission, were given the power to adjudicate dis-
putes arising from local development orders rendered pursuant to
critical area regulations.
As the Florida experience graphically illustrates, legislative enact-
ment of the Model Code's comprehensive administrative mechanism
for controlling critical areas does not produce immediate regulation
of all, or even very many, areas of critical state concern. Of Florida's
four critical areas, only two-the Green Swamp and the Florida
Keys-were the result of official administrative designations. More-
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over, while the original Environmental Land Act, unlike the Model
Code, permitted designation of both highly developed and rapidly
urbanizing areas in order to combat a myriad of urban problems, it
should be noted that with the exception of the Florida Keys, Florida
has used its critical areas technique only to protect natural resources
in largely undeveloped, environmentally sensitive areas. Neverthe-
less, even in the sparsely populated Big Cypress and Green Swamp
areas, attempts to include municipalities within the designated areas
encountered forceful opposition. Although the unofficially desig-
nated area, the Apalachicola River and Bay System, may illustrate
how the mere existence of a comprehensive administrative mecha-
nism can induce voluntary local land management programs, it also
provides further evidence of the political difficulty of officially acti-
vating such mechanisms.
Other disadvantages also inhere in the comprehensive administra-
tive approach. Administrative designation can be an extremely cum-
bersome and protracted process. Since designation is by
administrative rule, a critical area must be designated in accordance
with applicable administrative procedural requirements. In Florida,
for example, even if the Division of State Planning, on the basis of its
lengthy study of an area, persuades the Administration Commission
of the merits and political feasibility of a critical area designation,
adoption of the proposed designation rule by the Commission is sub-
ject to the notice, public hearing, rule challenge and judicial review
provisions of the Florida APA. As the Green Swamp designation
illustrates, these administrative procedural requirements not only
prolong the designation process but may, in a given case, actually
prevent designation. Such problems can be avoided by legislative
designation as the Florida Legislature recognized when it by-passed
the administrative process in directly conferring critical area status on
the Big Cypress.
Even if the designating agency successfully traverses the adminis-
trative obstacle course, the regulatory system established for the criti-
cal area by ALI-derivative legislation will be much weaker than the
critical area controls imposed under most of the ad hoc legislative
approaches. Both the Model Code and the Environmental Land Act
rely primarily on state agency review of local regulations and local
development orders issued under the state-approved local regula-
tions. Neither the ALI critical areas proposal nor its Florida off-
spring require advance preparation of a binding regional
comprehensive plan to which local regulations must conform. Given
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the extremely narrow scope of the regulations adopted in the Big
Cypress and the Green Swamp, the lack of experience with the more
extensive regulations adopted in the Florida Keys, and the appeal of
only one local critical area development order to the Adjudicatory
Commission, no meaningful conclusions can be drawn about the effi-
cacy of this approach to critical area management. It seems unlikely,
however, that a truly comprehensive regional approach can be devel-
oped under a pure Model Code system.
Fortunately, Florida has advanced beyond the Model Code by en-
acting state and local comprehensive planning legislation. Under the
state's local comprehensive planning Act, all local governments, in-
cluding those in critical areas, are required to adopt a local compre-
hensive plan with which all local regulations must be consistent.
Moreover, each local plan must be coordinated with the plans of ad-
joining local governments and reviewed by the Division of State
Planning, the appropriate regional planning agency, and, in the case
of municipalities, the county for conformity with state, regional and
county comprehensive plans. A weakness of this system is that state,
regional and county review is purely advisory. Given the acknowl-
edged importance of critical areas, a binding regional comprehensive
plan for designated critical areas seems both desirable and necessary.
At the very least the Florida Legislature, if it decides to retain the
existing system of state review of locally prepared plans, should
amend the state's planning legislation to require that local plans and
regulations in critical areas be consistent with the state comprehen-
sive plan and to provide for binding state review of local plans as
well as regulations. Simultaneously, the legislature should provide
that the standard for adjudicating disputes arising under local plans
and regulations in critical areas should be the legislatively approved
state comprehensive plan. These amendments would greatly facili-
tate development of a comprehensive regulatory strategy in critical
areas and avoid future challenges to the critical areas program under
the nondelegation doctrine.
In Cross Key Waterways the Florida Supreme Court held that two
of the Environmental Land Act's designation provisions lacked ade-
quate statutory standards and therefore constituted unlawful delega-
tions of legislative power to an administrative agency in violation of
the Florida Constitution. Although application of the non-delegation
doctrine would suggest that the act could be cured by legislative en-
actment of statutory standards, the court held, somewhat illogically,
that the legislature cannot delegate the power to designate critical ar-
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eas to an administrative agency. Rather, the legislature has the "con-
stitutional prerogative and duty to identify and designate those
resources and facilities" of critical state concern.
While the court's application of the non-delegation doctrine in
Cross Key' Waterways may seem strained, its decision that the legisla-
ture in some fashion must designate critical areas is a wise one. Criti-
cal area controls encroach not only upon private property rights but
also upon local governments which continue to occupy a special
place in the American political system.31 7 There is more than a grain
of truth in Judge Robert Smith's perceptive observation in the lower
court's opinion in Cross Key Waterways that the traditional primacy
of local government over certain matters, including land use regula-
tion, is inextricably linked to the constitutional right of access to gov-
ernment.318 Thus, while state supersession of local regulation of land
use may be necessary to protect vital public interests, the fundamen-
tal decision to reallocate the legislative power to regulate should be
made by the legislature.
State legislatures are capable of making such decisions. As the in-
troductory survey of ad hoc regional approaches illustrates, legisla-
tures in numerous states have not been reluctant to directly impose
317. Professor Robert Dahli, a prominent political scientist and a leading student
of the role of local government in the American political system, has contended that
local governments are much more important institutions of democratic self-govern-
ment than are the states. According to Professor Dahl:
the average American is bound to be much less concerned about the affairs of his
state than of his city or country. Too remote to stimulate much participation by
their citizens, and too big to make extensive participation by their citizens, and
too big to make extensive participation possible anyway, these units intermediate
between city and nation are probably destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-de-
mocracy. . . . Doubtless we shall continue to use the states as important inter-
mediate instruments of coordination and control-if for no other reason than the
fact that they are going institutions. But whenever we are compelled to choose
between city and state, we should always keep in mind, I think, that the city, not
the state, is the better instrument of popular government.
Dahl, The Ciy i the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 953, 968 (1967).
318. Judge Smith wrote that the Environmental Land Act:
touches sensibilities as old as the Revolution itself, because it affects the right of
access to government-the right of people effectively 'to instruct their representa-
tives, and to petition for redress of grievances' on which other cherished rights
ultimately depend. The primacy of local government jurisdiction in land devel-
opment regulation has traditionally been, in this country, a corollary of the peo-
ple's right of access to government. In a sense, therefore, the jurisdictional claim
of local governments in these matters is based on historical preferences stronger
than law.
351 So. 2d at 1065 (citation omitted).
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
land development controls on areas of critical state concern. Simi-
larly, the Florida Legislature has demonstrated its willingness and
ability to take such action by directly designating the Big Cypress and
redesignating the Green Swamp and Florida Keys as critical areas.
Requiring critical area designations to be made by the legislature
does not necessarily involve the sacrifice of the planning expertise
provided by a state land planning agency. For example, the Oregon
legislation provides for the designation of critical areas by the state
legislature pursuant to the report and recommendation of the state
land planning agency.319 This approach combines professional plan-
ning expertise with legislative oversight to ensure informed land use
decisions while simultaneously avoiding the non-delegation doctrine.
Is Cross Key Waterways the deathknell of Florida's critical areas
process? Recent actions by the Florida legislature suggest that the
program is still alive but not necessarily well. By redesignating the
Green Swamp and Florida Keys critical areas and adopting existing
guiding development principles and regulations, the 1979 legislature
insulated these two areas from further constitutional attacks based on
the nondelegation doctrine. The legislature failed to eliminate, how-
ever, the doctrine as a potential barrier to future designations. Al-
though the legislature amended the Environmental Land Act to
provide slightly more detailed standards for designating critical areas
and to require a weak form of legislative review of administrative
designations, the amendments may not satisfy the requirements of
Cross Key Waterways. Consequently, until the Florida Supreme
Court determines the validity of the new legislation, implementation
of the critical areas program will proceed under a constitutional
cloud.
Several other provisions of the new legislation also do not bode
well for the future utility of the critical areas technique. First, while
it reinstates the Green Swamp and Florida Keys designations, the
amendatory legislation provides for their termination no later than
July 1, 1982, provided the constituent local governments have
adopted a local comprehensive plan in conformity with the guiding
development principles. It also requires the removal of the City of
Key West, the most populous area of the Florida Keys, from that
critical area designation immediately upon approval by the Division
of State Planning of the land use element of the city's comprehensive
319. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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plan. 2° Second, all future designations must be repealed no later
than three years after approval of critical area land development reg-
ulations.32' Third, "area of major development potential" is abol-
ished as a critical area category, thereby greatly restricting the
potential scope of the technique.322 Finally, and perhaps most signif-
icantly, the new legislation signals a move toward a more voluntary,
cooperative approach by making appointment by the governor of a
resource planning and management committee, similar to the Apa-
lachicola River System council, a prerequisite to official designa-
tion 23 Consequently, even if the Florida critical areas process
survives Cross Key Waterways, future use of the technique, as origi-
nally conceived by the Model Code and the Environmental Land
Act, is unlikely.
Whatever its future and despite its limitations, the critical areas
technique has served a useful purpose in Florida. It has provided
temporary protection to several areas vital to the state's welfare, and
in the process, it has awakened the state's citizenry and local govern-
ments to the need for more effective management of Florida's land
resources. In the words of one observer, it has served as an invalua-
ble "attention getter" while the state attempts to implement a more
comprehensive planning and regulatory system.324
320. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73, §§ 5-6.
32 I. Id § 4(15). Note, however, that a repeal "may be limited to any portion of
the area of critical state concern" and is contingent upon state-approved local land
development regulations being in effect for at least 12 months and upon adoption by
the local government of a comprehensive plan that conforms to the guiding develop-
ment principles. Id Note also that provision is made for redesignation if "adminis-
tration of the local land development regulations within a formerly designated area is
inadequate to protect the former area of critical state concern." Id § 4(l)(d).
322. See id § 4(2).
323. Id § 2. "The objective of the committee shall be to organize a voluntary,
cooperative resource planning and management program to resolve existing, and pre-
vent future, problems which may endanger those resources, facilities, and areas" sub-
ject to designation. Id
324. Interview with Robert M, Rhodes, former Chief, Bureau of Land and Water
Management, Division of State Planning, State of Florida, in Tallahassee, Florida
(March 13, 1979).
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